# COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

#### PREFILED STAFF TESTIMONY

#### VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

In re: Virginia Electric and Power Company's Integrated Resource Plan filing pursuant to Va. Code § 56-597 et seq.

Case No. PUR-2018-00065

April 18, 2019

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### PART A

#### Summary of the Testimony of Earnest J. White

1 Staff evaluated Virginia Electric and Power Company's ("Company") 2018 Corrected IRP for 2 compliance with the Commission's December 7, 2018 Order ("2018 Order"). Primarily, my testimony addresses the Company's efforts to comply with a reevaluation of its capacity need using 3 Staff's recommended methodology. Staff believes that the Company's forecast methodology 4 reasonably approximates that recommended by Staff. I will discuss, at a high level, the Company's 5 6 assertions of its modeling limitations. Staff recommends that the Company make use of the new interim between IRP filings to continue to investigate its forecasting software and models. Further, 7 Staff recommends that the PJM Dominion Zone coincident peak forecast be the baseline from 8 which the Company evaluates its capacity need in future IRPs. 9

10 The Company also was ordered to model demand-side management ("DSM") as mandated by the 11 Senate Bill 966 ("SB 966"). The Company complied with this directive by quantifying an 12 approximate 200 megawatt decrease to its capacity forecast and an approximate 1,500 gigawatthour decrease to its energy forecast. The Company modeled these approximate capacity and 13 energy values both as supply-side and demand-side options, as the Commission ordered. Staff 14 recommends that the Company continue to model this mandate until such time as the mandate 15 expires or is satisfied. The Company should also, as it did in this filing, model existing programs, 16 programs proposed under the SB 966 mandate, and use its judgement to meet the remainder of the 17 mandated \$870 million in DSM-related programs required to be proposed by SB 966. 18

The final areas of the Company's 2018 Corrected IRP that I evaluated are related to the Company's 19 proposed solar photovoltaic ("Solar PV") generating resources. The 2018 Order stated that the 20 Company is to evaluate its future Solar PV resources assuming a capacity factor of 23 percent. 21 The Company complied with this directive. In selecting the 23 percent capacity factor, the 22 23 Commission stated in the 2018 Order that it weighed evidence regarding the causes of the actual solar capacity factors and evidence supporting technological efficiency improvements of solar 24 resources over time. Staff recommends that the Company continue to use a performance-weighted 25 capacity factor in evaluating its future Solar PV resources. Staff believes that such a methodology 26 will appropriately balance the performance that the Company expects and the performance that the 27 Company is achieving. 28

29 The 2018 Order found the Company's renewable energy certificate ("REC") price forecasting methodology to be unreasonable. The Commission ordered the Company to evaluate REC prices 30 by incorporating actual historic REC prices. While the Company used the REC price forecast that 31 the Commission found to unreasonable, as its starting point, the Company made some adjustments 32 based on historic REC prices. Staff recommends that the Company use a statistical method based 33 on historic REC prices as its starting point in future IRPs. From that point, the Company should 34 then consider sensitivities evaluating both market risk and policy risk to REC prices. Staff believes 35 this will better evaluate the risk ratepayers face should REC prices not materialize as the Company 36 projects. 37

#### PREFILED TESTIMONY OF EARNEST J. WHITE

#### VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

#### CASE NO. PUR-2018-00065

#### April 18, 2019

I	Q1.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND POSITION WITH THE STATE
2		CORPORATION COMMISSION ("COMMISSION").
3	A1.	My name is Earnest White. I am a Senior Utilities Analyst with the Commission's Division
4		of Public Utility Regulation.
5	Q2.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THE
6		CURRENT PROCEEDING.
7	A2.	On May 1, 2018, Virginia Electric and Power Company ("Company" or "Dominion") filed
8		its 2018 Integrated Resource Plan ("2018 IRP") pursuant to § 56-597 of the Code of
9		Virginia ("Code"). Beginning on September 24, 2018 the Commission convened a hearing
10		on the Company's 2018 IRP. This hearing concluded on September 27, 2018. On
11		December 7, 2018, the Commission issued an Order, stating its opinion and findings in the
1 <b>2</b>		2018 IRP proceeding. <sup>1</sup>
13		In its 2018 Order, the Commission determined that the Company failed to establish
14		that its 2018 IRP, as filed, was reasonable and in the public interest. <sup>2</sup> The 2018 Order
15		found that the Company's 2018 IRP failed to comply with the Commission's Order issued

<sup>1</sup> Commonwealth of Virginia, ex rel. State Corporation Commission In re: Virginia Electric and Power Company's Integrated Resource Plan filing pursuant to Va. Code § 56-597 et seq., Case No. PUR-2018-00065, Order (Dec. 7, 2018) ("2018 Order"). <sup>2</sup> Id. at 2-3.

1		on the Company's 2017 IRP. <sup>3</sup> The Commission further found that the Company was to
2		correct and refile its 2018 IRP subject to the provisions of the 2018 Order. <sup>4</sup> On March 7,
3		2019, the Company filed its corrections to its 2018 IRP ("2018 Corrected IRP"). My
4		testimony will address the 2018 Corrected IRP and the Company's assertions of compliance
5		with the 2018 Order.
6	Q3.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE AREAS WHERE THE COMMISSION FOUND
7		THAT THE COMPANY DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE ORDER ISSUED IN
8		THE 2017 IRP.
9	A3.	In the 2017 Order, the Commission took judicial notice of Senate Bill 966 ("SB 966") and
10		its necessary impacts on future IRPs. <sup>5</sup> The 2017 Order directed the Company to model the
11		new mandates contained in SB 966. <sup>6</sup> The Commission noted in its 2018 Order:
12 13 14		With respect to the requirement to address the mandates contained in Senate Bill 966, the record reflects that the Company included some, but not all, of those mandates in its 2018 IRP. <sup>7</sup>
15		The Commission found that the Company did include the Coastal Virginia Offshore
16		Wind project ("CVOW") and modeled solar photovoltaic ("Solar PV") resources including
1 <b>7</b>		and in excess of the amounts contemplated by SB 966.8 However, the Commission also
18		found that the Company did not model the amount of energy efficiency programs at a level
19		contemplated by SB 966, nor did the Company model a battery storage pilot as required
20		by SB 966.9 Additionally, the 2018 IRP did not include costs associated with the Strategic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> 2018 Order at 4-5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> *Id.* at 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Commonwealth of Virginia, ex rel. State Corporation Commission In re: Virginia Electric and Power Company's Integrated Resource Plan filing pursuant to Va. Code § 56-597 et seq., Case No. PUR-2017-00051, Order (Mar. 12, 2017) ("2017 Order") at 3. <sup>6</sup> Id. at 3-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> 2018 Order at 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Id.

<sup>°</sup> Id.

1		Undergrounding Pilot, the Grid Transformation Plan, or the Transmission Line
2		Undergrounding Pilot. <sup>10</sup>
3		As well, the 2017 Order directed the Company to model all other legal requirements
4		contained in the Code, primarily the utility's least-cost plan as well as plans compliant with
5		proposed federal carbon-control regulations. <sup>11</sup> The Commission noted in its 2018 Order:
6 7 8 9 10 11 12		The record in the instant proceeding reflects that the Company's least-cost plan includes resources, such as the [CVOW] demonstration project, that were not selected by the Company's modeling on a least-cost basis, but rather were forced into each of the Company's alternative plans. The record also reflects that the Company's modeling was not permitted to select certain highly-efficient natural gas-fired combined-cycle facilities for purposes of developing a least-cost plan. <sup>12</sup>
13		Based on the foregoing, the Commission found that the Company's 2018 IRP
14		neither complied with the 2017 Order nor established that the 2018 IRP was reasonable
15		and in the public interest. <sup>13</sup>
16	Q4.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE GUIDANCE THAT THE COMMISSION
17		PROVIDED TO THE COMPANY TO ADDRESS THE ABOVE FINDINGS.
18	A4.	The 2018 Order required that the Company submit a least-cost plan that neither forced the
19		modeling of any particular resource, nor excluded any reasonable resource. <sup>14</sup> The
20		Commission stated that this requirement:
21 22 23 24 25		[D]oes not reflect any finding that the Company should pursue any specific resource included in the least-cost plan; rather, as the Commission has repeatedly recognized, the IRP is a planning document, and it is reasonable, for planning purposes, to identify the least-cost plan to provide a benchmark against which to measure the costs of other alternative plans. <sup>15</sup>

- <sup>10</sup> 2018 Order at 4.
  <sup>11</sup> 2017 Order at 3.
  <sup>12</sup> 2018 Order at 3-4.
  <sup>13</sup> Id. at 4.
  <sup>14</sup> Id. at 5.
  <sup>15</sup> Id.

1		Additionally, the 2018 Order required the Company to calculate the incremental
2		costs impacts of the mandates contained in SB 966, including a comparison to the least-
3		cost plan. The Commission explains:
4 5 6 7 8		This includes CVOW; 5,000 MW <sup>16</sup> of nameplate wind and solar, including at least 25 percent of such resources from non-utility generators; \$870 million in spending on energy efficiency programs; the 30 MW battery storage pilot; the [Strategic Undergrounding Pilot]; the Grid Transformation Plan; and the Transmission Line Undergrounding Pilot. <sup>17</sup>
9		The Commission recognized that an IRP is a planning document and does not
10		approve any specific expenditure. <sup>18</sup> However, the Commission further stated that, "
11		[L]egally-mandated costs are likely to be borne by customers in one form or another, so it
12		is essential that an IRP provide the public and policymakers with projected costs for such
13		mandates that are as accurate as possible." <sup>19</sup>
14	Q5.	DID THE COMMISSION'S 2018 ORDER ADDRESS THE REASONABLENESS
15		OF OTHER ASPECTS OF THE COMPANY'S 2018 IRP?
16	A5.	Yes. The 2018 Order expressed "considerable doubt" in the reasonableness of the
17		Company's load forecast for use of predicting future energy and peak load requirements. <sup>20</sup>
18		The Commission also found that the Company should consider a lower capacity factor for
1 <b>9</b>		its future Solar PV facilities. <sup>21</sup> Finally, the Company's methodology for forecasting
20		renewable energy certificate ("REC") prices was found to be unreasonable. <sup>22</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Megawatts.
<sup>17</sup> 2018 Order at 5.
<sup>18</sup> Id. at 6.
<sup>19</sup> Id.
<sup>20</sup> Id. at 7.
<sup>21</sup> Id. at 9.
<sup>22</sup> Id.

### Q6. PLEASE STATE THE SPECIFIC AREAS OF THE COMPANY'S 2018 CORRECTED IRP THAT YOU WILL BE ADDRESSING IN YOUR TESTIMONY.

A6. My testimony will primarily focus on the Company's compliance with the Commission's directives regarding the reasonableness of its load and energy forecasts. I will also address
the Company's modeling of Solar PV capacity factors for its future facilities. Lastly, I will
comment on the Company's compliance with the Commission's directives regarding the
reasonableness of its REC price forecast. Staff witnesses Greg Abbott and Carol Myers
will discuss the balance of the issues. I will indicate where our testimonies overlap, as

9 well.

#### 10 Load Forecast

#### 11 Q7. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE COMMISSION'S DIRECTIVES REGARDING THE

#### 12 COMPANY'S LOAD FORECAST IN THE 2018 ORDER.

- 13 A7. The Commission's 2018 Order stated that for the purposes of the Corrected IRP:
- 14[T]he Company shall utilize the Dominion Zone PJM23 coincident peak load15forecast and energy sales forecast, scaled down to the Dominion load16serving entity level, consistent with the methodology presented by Staff17witness White...24
- 18 Further the Commission directed that:
- 19In order to assess more fully the impact of the requirement of Senate Bill20966 that the Company propose \$870 million in spending on new energy21efficiency programs by 2028, the Company shall also model the impact of22that requirement on the load forecast in all plans other than the least cost23plan.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>23</sup> PJM Interconnect, L.L.C

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> 2018 Order at 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Id.

Q8. HAS THE COMPANY COMPLIED WITH THE COMMISSION'S DIRECTIVE
 TO USE THE SPECIFIC FORECASTS AND METHODOLOGY THAT YOU
 RECOMMENDED IN YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY IN THE 2018 IRP
 HEARING?

A8. 5 The Company asserts that it complied with the Commission's directives to the best of its ability.<sup>26</sup> Staff agrees that the Company has made a good faith effort to comply with the 6 7 2018 Order. The Company states that due to the limitations of its modeling software the Company had to approximate the forecasts identified in the 2018 Order.<sup>27</sup> After reviewing 8 9 the Company's load forecast, for the purposes of the 2018 Corrected IRP, the Company's re-filed load forecast does reasonably approximate the methodology directed by the 2018 10 11 Order. Additionally, the Company is in compliance with regards to the use of the energy 12 sales forecast, as directed by the Commission. However, here the Company's modeling limitations must be considered. 13

## 14 Q9. COULD YOU FURTHER EXPLAIN THE COMPANY'S LIMITATIONS 15 MODELING THE PJM'S FORECAST?

A9. My understanding of the Company's methodology, as explained in the 2018 Corrected IRP,
 is that the Company can present its reliability requirement<sup>28</sup> based on PJM's coincident
 peak forecast; however, the Company cannot incorporate the PJM forecasts on an energy
 basis without further modification.<sup>29</sup> Both the peak and energy forecasts provided by PJM

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> 2018 Corrected IRP at 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Id. at 12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> The Company's share of the projected capacity that it must procure to ensure reliability within the greater PJM system.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> 2018 Corrected IRP at 12.

are annual data points. However, hourly values across the entire year are required in order 1 to forecast energy sales. As such, it is my understanding that the Company used PJM's 2 3 energy forecast but used its internally-produced load shape to derive a data set comprised of all 8.760 hours across the year.<sup>30</sup> For the purposes of the 2018 Corrected IRP this 4 produces a result that reasonably approximates PJM's forecast. The difference between 5 Staff's reserve requirement projection in the 2018 IRP and the Company's reserve 6 requirement projection in the 2018 Corrected IRP is now de minimis.<sup>31</sup> Staff witness 7 Abbott will discuss the effect of this reduction in the Company's expected reserve 8 requirement on the Company's least-cost plan. 9

	DOM LSE Re	serve Requiremen	t
Year	Staff 2018 IRP (MW)	Company 2018 Corrected IRP (MW)	Difference (%)
2019	19,351	19,339	0.06
2020	19,402	19,379	0.12
2021	19,572	19,548	0.12
2022	19,755	19,739	0.08
2023	19,887	19,841	0.23
2024	19,990	19,973	0.09
2025	20,138	20,128	0.05
2026	20,285	20,267	0.09
2027	20,472	20,451	0.10
2028	20,684	20,651	0.16
2029	20,876	20,825	0.25
2030	21,034	21,017	0.08
2031	21,191	21,200	0.04
2032	21,374	21,370	0.02
2033	21,533	21,551	0.08

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> 2018 Corrected IRP at 12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> The greatest absolute percent difference is now approximately two-tenths of one percent.

# Q10. THE COMMISSION ALSO DIRECTED THE COMPANY TO MODEL THE MANDATED \$870 MILLION IN PROPOSED ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS, DID THE COMPANY COMPLY WITH THIS DIRECTIVE?

A10. Yes. The Company projected approximately 200 MW and 1,500 gigawatt-hours ("GWh") 4 of demand-side management ("DSM"), in its 2018 Corrected IRP.<sup>32</sup> The Company 5 modeled this as both a supply-side resource, or as if it were a generating unit;<sup>33</sup> the 6 Company also modeled this as a demand-side resource, or as a reduction to its load and 7 energy forecasts.<sup>34</sup> The Company states that both the 200 MW and 1,500 GWh estimates 8 contain DSM which already exists, that was proposed in Case No. PUR-2018-00168, and 9 used generic assumptions to fill in the remainder of the required \$870 million DSM spend 10 mandated by the SB 966.<sup>35</sup> Staff believes that the Company has complied with the directive 11 to model its legally-mandated DSM-related proposals as both a reduction to its load 12 forecast and alongside its other supply-side resources. Staff witness Abbott discusses the 13 effects of the Company's DSM modeling assumptions on the Company's least-cost plan. 14

#### 15 Solar PV Capacity Factors

### Q11. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE COMMISSION'S DIRECTIVE REGARDING SOLAR PV CAPACITY FACTORS.

18 A11. The 2018 Order directed that:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> 2018 Corrected IRP at 8-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Id. at 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Id. at 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Id. at 4-5.

1 2 3		For the purposes of the Company's corrected 2018 IRP, the Commission finds that the Company should model a 23 percent capacity factor for solar PV resources. <sup>36</sup>
4		In selecting the 23 percent capacity factor, the Commission stated in the
5		2018 Order that it weighed evidence regarding the causes of the actual solar
6		capacity factors and evidence supporting technological efficiency improvements of
7		solar resources over time. <sup>37</sup>
8	Q12.	DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS REGARDING THE CAPACITY FACTORS
9		OF THE COMPANY'S EXISTING SOLAR PV UNITS?
10	A12.	Yes. In Case No. PUR-2018-00101, the Company stated that it expects to bid its Solar PV
11		resources into the PJM capacity market at a capacity factor of 23 percent. <sup>38</sup> In the 2018
12		IRP, the Company modeled its generic Solar PV facilities at a capacity factor of 25
13		percent. <sup>39</sup> Lastly, in the US-3 Proceeding, a 28 percent design capacity factor was
14		projected. <sup>40</sup>
15		However, it appears that the Company's Solar PV facilities have achieved a
16		capacity factor closer to 20 percent. <sup>41</sup> Staff witness Abbott focuses on the actual
17		performance of the Solar PV generating units in his testimony.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> 2018 Order at 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Id.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Petition of Virginia Electric and Power Company, For approval and certification of the proposed US-3 Solar Projects pursuant to §§ 56-580 D and 56.46.1 of the Code of Virginia, and for approval of a rate adjustment clause, designated Rider US-3, under § 56-585.1 A 6 of the Code of Virginia, Case No. PUR-2018-00101. ("US-3 Proceeding"). Exhibit 4 at 19.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> 2018 IRP at 167.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> US-3 Proceeding, Exhibit 12 at 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> See Staff Attachment EJW-1. Company's response to Staff Interrogatory No. 19-177.

1	Q13.	DID THE COMPANY MODEL THE CAPACITY FACTOR OF ITS FUTURE
2		SOLAR PV RESOURCES AT A CAPACITY FACTOR OF 23 PERCENT?
3	A13.	Yes. The Company states that it modeled its future Solar PV resources at a capacity factor
4		of 23 percent. <sup>42</sup> Staff believes this to be an appropriate planning figure that balances the
5		value at which the Company expects its units to perform over the Planning Period <sup>43</sup> and
6		the observed performance of the Company's current fleet of Solar PV generating units.
7	<u>REC I</u>	<u>Prices</u>
8	Q14.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE COMMISSION'S DIRECTIVE REGARDING THE
9		COMPANY'S REC PRICE FORECASTING METHODOLOGY.
10	A14.	The 2018 Order directed that:
11 12 13		For purposes of the corrected 2018 IRP filing, the Company shall present an alternative methodology for forecasting REC prices that incorporates actual observable market prices for RECs. <sup>44</sup>
14	Q15.	DID THE COMPANY COMPLY WITH THIS DIRECTIVE?
15	A15.	In the 2018 Corrected IRP, the Company asserts that it modeled an alternative methodology
16		that "incorporates actual observed prices for RECs."45 The Company asserts that its
17		methodology benchmarks fundamental forecasts of REC prices to actual market prices to
18		account for the economic imperfections in REC markets, such as illiquidity, imperfect
19		information, and surplus capacity. <sup>46</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> 2018 Corrected IRP at 4.
<sup>43</sup> 2019-2033.
<sup>44</sup> 2018 Order at 10.
<sup>45</sup> 2018 Corrected IRP at 17. See Staff Attachment EJW-2. Company's response to Staff Interrogatory No. 19-,

<sup>172(</sup>b). <sup>46</sup> 2018 Corrected IRP at 17.

### Q16. WHAT IS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMPANY'S ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGY.

A16. The Company's alternative methodology is still tied to its original methodology.<sup>47</sup> That is 3 4 to say that the Company did not produce a fundamentals forecast based on the supply and demand for RECs in the market. Rather, as in the 2018 IRP, the Company first calculated 5 the price of RECs as the residual value needed to make its resources whole net of energy 6 and capacity revenues that the units are projected to receive in PJM's markets. The 7 8 Company added a second step that it asserts takes into account the difference between the 9 prices required for cost recovery and the actual prices received in the market, historically.<sup>48</sup> The Company referred to this second step as discounting in the 2018 Corrected IRP filing. 10 The Company asserted that this discounting was applied in "all years in which projected 11 prices exceed an anticipated price floor reflective of administrative cost."49 12

### Q17. DO YOU HAVE SUGGESTIONS THAT THE COMPANY SHOULD CONSIDER IN FUTURE IRPS?

A17. Yes. Broadly speaking, Staff does not believe that there is much useful information in a
 point estimate of a future REC price. Staff believes that once the Company has produced
 a forecast based on actual historic REC prices, the Company should then build varying
 REC price scenarios and model run sensitivities. In addition, if the Company is aware of
 risks, such as the closure of certain REC markets, it should provide sensitivity model runs
 accounting for that risk and the impact to the Company's plans. Staff recognizes the limited

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> 2018 Corrected IRP at 17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Id.

timeframe to prepare the 2018 Corrected IRP. However, in future IRPs, the Company 1 2 should take efforts to better model the *risk* associated with REC prices rather than REC prices themselves. In Staff's opinion, fundamentals forecasting does not lend itself to 3 forward REC prices. 4

By incorporating historic prices, and using sensitivity testing, the Company can 5 produce forecasts that consider the risk should the Company not realize a REC price 6 required for cost recovery. The Company's resources are made whole through rates. Thus, 7 the real question is not how much REC revenue the Company needs to receive. Rather the 8 questions to consider in planning are: to what degree are ratepayers exposed should REC 9 10 revenue fail to materialize? Additionally, how would such a shortfall in REC revenue affect the Company's build plans?<sup>50</sup> 11

#### Recommendations 12

#### PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMISSION. 13 **O18**.

14 A18. Given that the Company's next IRP filing will be filed in 2020, and then spaced three years apart, Staff has made recommendations for the Company to consider prior to its 2020 IRP 15 16 filing. Regarding the Company's load and energy forecasts, Staff recommends that in future IRPs the Company's baseline peak and energy forecasts be derived from the most 17 recently available PJM coincident peak and energy sales forecasts, in the same manner as 18 it has been derived in the 2018 Corrected IRP. The PJM coincident peak forecast is the 19 basis on which the Company's ultimate capacity obligation will be set. Thus, this is the 20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Staff recognizes REC prices above those required for cost recovery might also affect the Company's build plans.

logical place to start. In addition, PJM's load forecasting process has generally been transparent, and its data and results are posted publicly.

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The Company could still present its internal forecast as a sensitivity. Staff would consider any verifiable evidence that the Company presents based on its internal forecasts. Ultimately, it is Staff's opinion that the Company should plan to procure adequate capacity to meet its capacity obligation as a member of PJM.<sup>51</sup> Thus, accurate forecasts of this obligation are the reasonable standard on which the Company should plan its resource requirements. PJM's forecasts are not perfect. However, the Company's obligation to meet its capacity obligation as determined by PJM cannot be debated.

Additionally, the Company should continue to incorporate the capacity value of the 10 legally-mandated DSM proposals into its load forecast. As well, the Company should 11 incorporate the energy value of the legally-mandated DSM proposals into its energy sales 12 13 forecast. Lastly, Staff recommends that the Company continue to investigate its load and energy forecasting software, models, and methodologies in the interim to ensure that they 14 remain current and reasonable. Staff recognizes the short timeframe for filing the 2018 15 16 Corrected IRP; however, prior to filing future IRPs, the Company should consider such an undertaking. 17

18 Regarding Solar PV capacity factors, in future IRPs, the Company should continue 19 to model Solar PV resources with a performance-weighted capacity factor, as may be 20 directed by the Commission.<sup>52</sup> As an example, should the Commission choose to 21 formalize this approach in a generic sense, the Commission may consider a projected Solar

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> See Staff Attachment EJW-3, Application for membership in the regional transmission organization known as *PJM Interconnection, LLC*, Case No. PUE-20003-00284.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> The 2018 Order directed the Company to model a capacity factor of 23 percent which balances the current expected capacity factors with the current actual observed performance of the Company's Solar PV units.

PV capacity factor weighted by the design capacity factor of the Company's future Solar PV units and by the three-year average performance capacity factor of the Company's existing Solar PV units. An additional formulation that the Commission may consider would be weighting the projected capacity factor by the expected PJM firm capacity of the Company's future Solar PV units and the three-year average performance capacity factor of the Company's existing Solar PV units.

The Company's current Solar PV units have not yet achieved the Company's projected capacity factors, on an annual average basis. Thus, Staff believes that a performance-weighted capacity factor is a reasonable tradeoff between the expected capacity value and the actual capacity factors of Solar PV units.<sup>53</sup> Staff recognizes that any IRP is a planning document. However, where the Company can incorporate Virginia and utility specific data rather than generalized engineering projections, it would be prudent to do so.

Finally, regarding the Company's REC price forecast, Staff readily admits that the Company's filing could be determined to have met the Commission's directive to "incorporate historic prices" for the purposes of the 2018 Corrected IRP. However, in future IRPs, the Company should take Staff's critiques under advisement and continue to refine its REC price forecasting to: a statistical projection based on historic prices; abandon the incremental cost forecasting methodology; and incorporate reasonably known risks to REC prices in the foreseeable future.

## Q19. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY ON THE COMPANY'S 2018 CORRECTED IRP?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> As Staff witness Abbott discusses, this performance concern is greatly mitigated with third-party power purchase agreements.

1 A19. Yes.

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#### STAFF ATTACHMENT EJW-1

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY CORRECTED INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN FILING 2018 CASE NO. PUR-2018-00065 RESPONSE TO QUESTION NO. 177 STAFF'S NINETEENTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

190420137

#### Staff Set 19-177: Update to Attachment Staff Set 2-18(d) (JMB)

		Average Annual Capacity Factors <sup>1</sup>								
	COD Year	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Average		
Company Owned Solar Facilities:										
Morgan's Corner	2015				19.2%	19.6%	16.2%	18.3%		
Whitehouse	2016					20.4%	16.2%	18.3%		
Scott	2016					20.4%	13.7%	17.1%		
Woodland	2016					16.7%	19.1%	17.9%		
Remington	2017						20.3%	20.3%		
Oceana	2017						17.8%	17.8%		
Hollyfield	2018							N/A		
Puller	2018							N/A		
Pecan	2018							N/A		
Montross	2018							N/A		
Solar Partnership Program	Varies2					13.5%	0.7%	7.1%		

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#### STAFF ATTACHMENT EJW-2

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY CORRECTED INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN FILING 2018 CASE NO. PUR-2018-00065 RESPONSE TO QUESTION NO. 172 (b) STAFF'S NINETEENTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

18

#### <u>Virginia Electric and Power Company</u> <u>Case No. PUR-2018-00065</u> <u>Virginia State Corporation Commission Staff</u> <u>Nineteenth Set</u>

The following response to Question No. 172 (b) of the Nineteenth Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents Propounded by the Virginia State Corporation Commission Staff received on March 13, 2019 has been prepared under my supervision.

Maria F. Scheller Vice President and Director ICF

Question No. 172 (b)

Please reference Figure 10 on page 17 of the corrected IRP and provide the following:

b) Did the source data include historic sales into the Pennsylvania solar REC market? If so, please recalculate Figure 10 removing those sales.


#### Response:

b) The methodology relied on considered historical Tier 1 REC pricing only. It did not rely on historical sales into the Pennsylvania solar REC market.


Regarding solar REC pricing, for the 2018 Compliance Filing, ICF was asked to review and revise the REC price forecast which was generated for the 2018 Plan. ICF's analysis for the 2018 Plan was originally prepared in late 2017, and the update to that forecast [prepared for the 2018 Compliance Filing] is based on information consistent with the vintage of that forecast. In other words, the revised forecast [prepared for the 2018 Compliance Filing] is an update to the original forecast [prepared for the 2018 Plan], rather than a fully revised forecast.

At the time of the 2017 forecasts, Solar and Tier 1 markets had been trending together for several years, as shown in the images below available from the U.S. Renewable Portfolio Standards 2018 Annual Status Report, Galen Barbose, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory November 2018. These images show downward trending prices for both Tier 1 and solar RECs in PJM states at low prices:

Ø



Source: Marex Spectron. Piotled values are the average monthly closing price for the p current or nearest future compliance year traded in each month.



More recently, due to changes in the Pennsylvania RPS carve out related to solar resource qualification, prices are trending upward for solar RECs. The changes in SREC policy are not considered within this forecast. Further, the qualification process is still currently active and a final determination of such has not been made such that the stability of SREC pricing and trending remains questionable at this time.

#### STAFF ATTACHMENT EJW-3

#### VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

#### **CORRECTED INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN FILING 2018**

#### CASE NO. PUR-2018-00065

#### APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATION KNOWN

#### AS PJM INTERCONNECTION, LLC, CASE NO. PUE-2003-00284



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Paul D. Koonce Chief Executive Officer - Transmission Dominion Energy, Inc. 120 Tredegar Street, Richmond, VA 23219 Phone: 804-819-2390, Fax: 804-819-2221

June 27, 2003

Mr. Joel Peck, Clerk State Corporation Commission Document Control Center 1300 East Main Street Tyler Building, First Floor Richmond, VA 23219

Dear Mr. Peck:

PUE-2003-00284

Dominion Virginia Power is pleased to submit to the Commission the enclosed application for membership in the regional transmission organization known as PJM Interconnection, LLC ("PJM"). The integration of Dominion Virginia Power's transmission system into PJM will facilitate the development of competitive wholesale and retail electricity markets, as envisioned by the General Assembly when it enacted the Restructuring Act.

Among the Important benefits that will result from Dominion Virginia Power's participation in PJM, are the following:

- PJM membership gives Dominion Virginia Power's customers improved access to an expanded inventory of generation totaling hearly 170,000 megawatts: This includes generation to the north and west of Virginia that is cheaper than presently available, and under PJM an increased amount of this would be imported to provide customer savings. In addition access to excess regional generating capacity means that the need to build new generation in Virginia will be reduced in the future?
- Native load is protected. Dominion Virginia Power has taken extraordinary steps to insure that its customers will never have to do without electricity in order for PJM to serve customers elsewhere in the region. There will be no blackouts in Virginia so that people in Philadelphia can have their lights on.
- As required by HB2453, Dominion has conducted a cost-benefit study of its integration into PJM. The results of this study confirm the advantages of membership in regional transmission organizations envisioned by the General Assembly when it passed the Restructuring Act. These advantages include:

-Improved reliability through increased access to a larger and more diverse fleet of generators.

-Substantial savings for customers through access to lower cost power. -Dominion Virginia Power, which is a net importer of electricity today, will increase its imports under PJM, delivering savings to customers. -PJM participation will facilitate both wholesale and retail competition.

Our application shows that Dominion Virginia Power's membership in PJM is the best way to ensure that <u>Virginia</u> has a reliable, stable and affordable source of electricity into the future. This is critical for continued economic development in the Commonwealth.

This application also demonstrates that Commission approval of PJM integration is consistent with the intent of the General Assembly as expressed in the Restructuring Act and the Commission's responsibility to ensure reliable and competitively-priced electric service to the citizens of Virginia. Examination of the costs and benefits of PJM integration, its positive impact on reliability and the arrangements that we have made to protect native load customers will show that Dominion's participation in PJM is in the best Interest of Virginia's consumers.

Integration of Dominion Virginia Power's transmission facilities into PJM is consistent with the public interest and will promote economic development in Virginia. We therefore hope that this application will proceed to approval on a schedule in accord with HB2453 so that Virginia consumers may realize these important benefits at the earliest possible time.

Sincerely,

Jank Home

cc: Mr. Ronald A. Gibson Mr. William F. Stephens Mr. Richard J. Williams Mr. Howard M. Spinner Mr. Cody D. Walker Arlen Bolstad, Esquire Ms. Rebecca W. Hartz

and that the latter fly

1 2 validated. In addition, Virginia will retain its important role in siting transmission enhancements.

In many respects, PJM's approach to transmission planning is no different than what happens with natural gas pipelines today. Taking a regional look at natural gas infrastructure has resulted in the approval of the Cove Point LNG Terminal and the Greenbrier Pipeline as well as the filed Mid-Atlantic expansion – all facilities that originate outside Virginia, but directly benefit consumers in Virginia and encourage continued economic expansion for the Commonwealth.

9 Ronnie Bailey addresses transmission planning benefits in more detail in his testimony.
10 In addition, the Cost Benefit Study examines this benefit.

11

#### 12 Q. Will PJM provide savings to the Company's retail customers?

Yes. The Cost Benefit Study examined the quantitative net benefits to the Company's 13 14 customers of Dominion Virginia Power joining PJM. The Cost Benefit Study indicates 15 that joining PJM will result in significant quantitative net benefits to Dominion Virginia Power's customers through reduced net energy and capacity costs. This result stems 16 17 principally from greater access to lower cost energy sources and from a reduced need for 18 Dominion Virginia Power to build new high cost, natural gas fired capacity when the 19 Company can obtain greater access to resources in the larger PJM footprint. These 20 savings are derived after factoring in PJM's administrative charges. The study also 21 details soveral qualitative benefits of joining PJM including enhanced reliability in the 22 Company's service territory through efficient congestion management, greater access to

10

1 load-serving entities (LSEs) in PJM. The PJM Office of Interconnection is 2 responsible for calculating the amount of generating capacity required to meet the RAA-defined reliability criteria. Following a period of stakeholder 3 review and comment through the Planning Committee, the RAA-Reliability ·4 Committee approves the final reserve margin. This final reserve margin is 5 then the basis for allocating a capacity obligation to each LSE within PJM, б including utilities, co-ops, munis and Competitive Service Providers (CSPs), 7 based on that LSE's share of the PJM summer peak load. 8

#### Q. Please describe PJM's uniform capacity rules.

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20

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10 A. PJM's capacity rules include the following key features:

11 Assessment of resource adequacy in PJM begins with determination 12 of the level of installed reserves necessary to meet a loss of load 13 probability criterion of one deficiency in ten years. This is a standard commonly used throughout the utility industry and is also 14 the current standard of the Mid-Atlantic Area Council (MAAC) 15 region within PJM. The process determines the amount of 16 17 generating capacity required to provide electrical energy to satisfy customer load, especially during peak demand periods, and ensure 18 19 an acceptable level of service reliability.

 Supply resources used to meet this requirement must pass PJM's deliverability test. This test assesses the ability of the transmission

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### PART B

#### Summary of the Testimony of Gregory L. Abbott

2 3 4		My testimony addresses Virginia Electric and Power Company's ("Company") Corrected 2018 Integrated Resource Plan ("Corrected 2018 IRP"). My testimony makes the following findings and recommendations:
5 6 7	•	Using the PJM-derived load and energy sales forecast instead of the Company's internal load and energy sales forecasts results in the least-cost plan for the Corrected 2018 IRP being nearly <u>\$8 billion</u> less costly than the Company's least-
8		cost plan in the 2018 IRP as originally filed;
9	٠	If the cold reserve units and Possum Point Unit 5 ("PP5") are not retired, the
10 11		Company does not need to build any resources of any kind until 2029. Under this scenario, over the 15-year planning period, the model only selects 916 megawatts
12		("MW") of natural-gas fired combustion turbine units;
13	٠	The realized net present value ("NPV") cost savings over the 25-year study period
14		of retiring the cold reserve units and PP5 is just \$150 million on a build plan with
15	-	an NPV cost exceeding \$25 billion or a cost reduction of about 0.6%; Staff does not believe the cost savings are so compelling that it necessarily justifies
16 17	٠	retiring approximately 2,100 MWs of capacity over such a short timeframe;
18	٠	The incremental NPV cost of the 2018 Grid Transformation and Security Act
19	•	compared to the least-cost plan is <u>\$5.81 billion;</u>
20	•	The solar purchase power agreement ("solar PPA") option is substantially less
21		costly than the Company-build solar option;
22	٠	Under the solar PPA option, all performance risk is borne by the non-utility solar
23		generator rather than the Company's customers;
24	٠	Under the Company-build solar option, the performance risk is borne by the
25		Company's customers, absent a performance guarantee;
26	٠	Residential and small commercial customers are particularly better off under the
27		solar PPA option given that costs are allocated on an energy basis and all rate
28		classes pay the same price per megawatt-hour;
29	٠	Staff notes that the Company often will perform an analysis on the positive
30		economic impact associated with a generating unit that it proposes to build to justify
31		its approval as part of the broader public interest. Staff believes such an analysis
32		should also be performed before the Company makes a final decision to retire a
33	_	generating unit; Despite the Company's positive cost-benefit analysis of its unit retirements, the
34 35	•	immediate impact to customers will be higher monthly bills; and
36	•	The costs of the replacement capacity will predominately be recovered through
37	•	Rate Adjustment Clauses that will immediately show up on the customer bill upon
38		approval by the Commission. The benefits of the generating unit retirements come
39		in the form of avoided variable O&M costs from operating the retiring units which
40		are booked to base rates. In the near term, the benefits go to the shareholders until
41		such time that they eventually trickle down to customers most likely in the form of
42		higher customer credit offsets than might otherwise be expected.

#### **PUBLIC VERSION**

#### PREFILED TESTIMONY OF GREGORY L. ABBOTT

#### VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY'S INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN FILING

#### CASE NO. PUR-2018-00065

1 Q1.	PLEASE	STATE	YOUR	NAME	AND	POSITION	WITH	THE	VIRGINIA
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- 2 STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION ("COMMISSION").
- A1. My name is Gregory L. Abbott. I am a Deputy Director in the Commission's
  Division of Public Utility Regulation.

### 5 Q2. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS

#### 6 PROCEEDING?

- 7 A2. My testimony addresses Virginia Electric and Power Company's ("DEV" or
- 8 "Company") Corrected 2018 Integrated Resource Plan ("Corrected 2018 IRP")
- 9 filed in compliance with the Commission's December 7, 2018 Order ("Re-File
- 10 Order") in this proceeding. Specifically, my testimony:
- Evaluates whether the Corrected 2018 IRP complies with the Commission's directive to develop a least-cost plan that does not force the modeling to select any resource, nor exclude any reasonable resource;
- Evaluates whether the Corrected 2018 IRP complies with the Commission's directive to calculate the incremental cost impacts of the mandates contained in the 2018 Grid Transformation and Security Act ("GTSA"),<sup>1</sup> including a comparison to the identified least-cost plan;
- 18 19

• Describes the impact on the build plans and the net present value ("NPV") costs of the various plans of using, as directed by the Commission, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Also referred to as Senate Bill 966.

- Dominion Zone PJM coincident peak load forecast and energy sales forecast, scaled down to the Dominion load serving entity level;
  Discusses the results of using, as directed by the Commission, a 23% capacity factor for solar resources, updates actual historic performance of the Company's existing solar resources through February 2019, and discusses the implications for the modeling of solar resources in future IRP
- 8 Discusses the Company's generating unit retirement analysis;
- Addresses the implications for the IRP planning process of the Company's
   March 25, 2019 presentation to the New York Stock Exchange regarding
   the Company's recently announced plans to move forward with \$17 billion
   of capital spending in Virginia over the 2019 through 2023 period; and
  - Makes recommendations for information and analyses that the Commission consider as requirements for inclusion in future IRP filings.
- 15 Q3. DO YOU HAVE ANY GENERAL COMMENTS?

filings;

7

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14

A3. Yes. Staff has reviewed the Corrected 2018 IRP and believes that the Company 16 has made a good faith effort to comply with all the requirements contained in the 17 Commission's Re-File Order. However, given that both the generating unit 18 retirement analysis and the analysis of demand-side management ("DSM") 19 20 programs are performed outside of the PLEXOS model and the results of these analyses are then an input into the PLEXOS model, Staff requested additional 21 PLEXOS model runs through discovery to confirm that the Company's identified 22 least-cost plan in the Corrected 2018 IRP is the least-cost plan consistent with the 23 directives in the Commission's Re-File Order. This will be discussed in greater 24 25 detail later in my testimony.

The Company provides updated model results for the various Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative ("RGGI") Plans B, C, and D using the model inputs directed by the Commission in its Re-File Order. However, the Company did not

update the model assumption for the carbon cap to reflect the final proposed rule 1 emissions cap for Virginia of 28 million tons beginning in 2020 which decreases 2 3% per year through 2030, as proposed in Virginia State Air Pollution Control 3 Board regulations currently under review. Instead, the Company assumed a much 4 5 higher emissions cap for Virginia consistent with the model assumption it used in 6 the 2018 IRP as originally filed. Therefore, the costs for RGGI compliance for the 7 various RGGI Plans B through D will be higher than the costs presented in the Corrected 2018 IRP. Staff views the results of the RGGI Plans presented in the 8 9 Corrected 2018 IRP to be of limited value and will, therefore, not be discussed 10 further in my testimony.

11 LEAST-COST PLAN

### 12 Q4. WHAT DID THE COMMISSION'S RE-FILE ORDER REQUIRE FOR THE 13 LEAST-COST PLAN?

A4. The Commission's Re-File Order states the following regarding the least-cost plan
(emphasis added):

In its corrected 2018 IRP, for purposes of its least-cost plan, the 16 17 Company shall not force the modeling to select any resource, nor exclude any reasonable resource. This requirement does not reflect 18 any finding that the Company should pursue any specific resource 19 20 included in the least-cost plan; rather, as the Commission has repeatedly recognized, the IRP is a planning document, and it is 21 reasonable, for planning purposes, to identify the least-cost plan to 22 provide a benchmark against which to measure the costs of other 23 alternative plans.<sup>2</sup> 24

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Re-File Order at 5 (internal footnotes omitted).

#### 1 Q5. DID THE COMPANY IDENTIFY A LEAST-COST PLAN AS DIRECTED

#### 2 BY THE COMMISSION IN THE RE-FILE ORDER?

Yes, the Company identifies Plan A: No CO<sub>2</sub> Tax as its least-cost plan. The A5. 3 modeling for the Corrected 2018 IRP least-cost plan differs from the 2018 IRP 4 5 least-cost plan as originally filed as follows: The Company used the Dominion Zone PJM coincident peak load forecast 6 and energy sales forecast, scaled down to the Dominion load serving entity 7 level, as directed by the Commission; 8 9 • The Company used a 23% capacity factor for solar as directed by the Commission: 10 11 The solar purchase power agreement ("solar PPA") option was an available resource option for the model to select; 12 13 The natural gas-fired 3X1 combined cycle unit was an available resource option for the model to select; 14 The Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind ("CVOW") demonstration project was not forced into the model; and 15 The Company included proposed DSM spending of approximately \$298 million currently pending before the Commission in Case No. PUR-2018-00168 as a fixed input into the PLEXOS model.<sup>3</sup> Q6. DOES STAFF AGREE THAT THE COMPANY'S PLAN A IS THE LEAST-16 17 COST PLAN CONSISTENT WITH THE DIRECTIVES IN THE **COMMISSION'S RE-FILE ORDER?** 18 A6. Yes. 19

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> This \$298 million of proposed DSM programs is inclusive of lost revenues. In addition, the Company counts this as a component of the \$870 million of DSM spending goal under the GTSA.

1	Q7.	HOW DOES THE LEAST-COST PLAN IN THE CORRECTED 2018 IRP	
2		COMPARE TO THE LEAST-COST PLAN IN THE 2018 IRP AS	
3		ORIGINALLY FILED?	
4	A7.	A comparison of the NPV cost of the two least cost plans is shown below.	
5		<u>NPV Cost (SB)</u>	
6		Least Cost Plan (as originally filed) 33.34	
7		Least Cost Plan (Corrected 2018 IRP) 25.42	
8		Difference (7.92)	
9 10		The least-cost plan for the Corrected 2018 IRP is nearly <u>\$8 billion</u> less costly than the Company's least-cost plan as originally filed.	
II	Q8.	WHY IS THE NPV COST OF THE LEAST-COST PLAN IN THE	
12		CORRECTED 2018 IRP SO MUCH LOWER THAN THE LEAST-COST	
12 13		CORRECTED 2018 IRP SO MUCH LOWER THAN THE LEAST-COST PLAN IN THE 2018 IRP AS ORIGINALLY FILED?	
	A8.		
13	A8.	PLAN IN THE 2018 IRP AS ORIGINALLY FILED?	
13 14	A8.	PLAN IN THE 2018 IRP AS ORIGINALLY FILED? This is predominately due to using the Dominion Zone PJM coincident peak load	
13 14 15	A8.	PLAN IN THE 2018 IRP AS ORIGINALLY FILED? This is predominately due to using the Dominion Zone PJM coincident peak load forecast and energy sales forecast, scaled down to the Dominion load serving entity	
13 14 15 16	A8.	PLAN IN THE 2018 IRP AS ORIGINALLY FILED? This is predominately due to using the Dominion Zone PJM coincident peak load forecast and energy sales forecast, scaled down to the Dominion load serving entity level, as directed by the Commission. This forecast is significantly lower than the	1
13 14 15 16 17	A8.	PLAN IN THE 2018 IRP AS ORIGINALLY FILED? This is predominately due to using the Dominion Zone PJM coincident peak load forecast and energy sales forecast, scaled down to the Dominion load serving entity level, as directed by the Commission. This forecast is significantly lower than the Company's internal load and energy sales forecast that was used in the 2018 IRP as	
13 14 15 16 17 18	A8.	PLAN IN THE 2018 IRP AS ORIGINALLY FILED? This is predominately due to using the Dominion Zone PJM coincident peak load forecast and energy sales forecast, scaled down to the Dominion load serving entity level, as directed by the Commission. This forecast is significantly lower than the Company's internal load and energy sales forecast that was used in the 2018 IRP as originally filed. This lower load and energy sales forecast results in a substantial	

1		Renewable	Fossil
2		<u>(MWs)</u>	<u>(MWs)</u>
3 4	Least-Cost Plan (as filed)	4,731	4,122
5	Least-Cost Plan (Corrected 2018 IRP)	<u>480</u>	<u>3,206</u>
6 7	Difference	(4,251)	(916)

The 480 megawatts ("MW or MWs") of solar resources for the Corrected 8 2018 least-cost plan represent 160 MWs<sup>4</sup> of solar PPAs annually from 2020 through 9 10 2022. These solar PPAs were selected by the model on a cost-optimization basis. However, once the investor tax credit expires in 2022, the solar PPAs are no longer 11 competitive with the market. Staff notes that if the investor tax credit is extended 12 13 in the future, as it has been in the past, then the solar PPA option will likely remain competitive with the market and would be selected by the model beyond 2022. 14 15 Staff further notes that the model does not select any Company-build solar 16 resources. This demonstrates that the solar PPA option is currently a lower cost option that is more competitive with the market than the Company-build solar 17 resources.5 18

# Q9. DID STAFF CONFIRM THAT INCLUDING THE RESULTS OF THE COMPANY'S GENERATING UNIT RETIREMENT ANALYSIS AS AN

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The Company included a model constraint that limited the availability of solar PPAs to 160 MWs annually.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> This is consistent with the record in Case No. PUR-2018-00101 for approval of the US-3 solar projects which showed that solar PPAs were a lower cost option. The levelized cost of electricity ("LCOE") for a 20-year solar PPA was approximately \$41 per MWh compared to approximately \$61 per MWh for the US-3 Company-build solar projects.

# INPUT INTO THE PLEXOS MODEL IS PART OF THE LEAST COST PLAN?

Yes. As previously mentioned, the Company performed its economic analysis A9. 3 4 regarding unit retirements outside of the PLEXOS model runs that supported its 2018 IRP, as originally filed. The identified unit retirements and the timing of the 5 6 unit retirements were then fixed inputs into the PLEXOS model. In order to confirm that the Company's scheduled retirements of the cold reserve units and 7 Possum Point Unit 5 ("PP5") are part of the least-cost plan, Staff requested that the 8 Company perform a PLEXOS model run where the cold reserve units and PP5 are 9 not retired and are instead available for dispatch in the model.<sup>6</sup> The Company's 10 response to Staff Interrogatory No. 21-1837 shows the results of this model run 11 compared to the least-cost plan in the Corrected 2018 IRP. The Company's 12 response for the 15-year planning period is reproduced below: 13

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The Company recently announced that the cold reserve units would be retiring by the end of the March 2019 and that PP5 would be retiring in 2021. The following units were placed in cold reserve status during 2018: Bellemeade 1, Bremo 3 & 4, Mecklenberg 1 & 2, Pittsylvania 1, Chesterfield 3 & 4, and Possum Point 3 & 4, representing 1,292 MW of generating capacity. Including the 786 MW of capacity for PP5, a total of 2,078 MW of generating capacity is retired in the least-cost plan. <sup>7</sup> Attachment GLA-1

1 2 3		Least-Cost <u>Corrected 2</u>		Least-Cost Plan A <u>Staff Set No. 21-183</u>			
4		No CO <sub>2</sub>		No CO <sub>2</sub>			
5		Base		No Cold Storage/PP5			
6		Dase		Retirements			
7				Keth chief	115		
8		<b>Renewable</b>	Fossil	Renewable	<u>Fossil</u>		
9	2019	0	0	0	0		
10	2020	160	Õ	Ő	Õ		
11	2021	160	Õ	Ő	Õ		
12	2022	160	458	0	Õ		
13	2023	0	458	0	0		
14	2024	0	458	0	0		
15	2025	0	458	0	0		
16	2026	0	0	0	0		
17	2027	0	0	0	0		
18	2028	0	458	0	0		
19	2029	0	0	0	458		
20	2030	0	0	0	0		
21	2031	0	458	0	458		
22	2032	0	0	0	0		
23	2033	0	458	0	0		
24	Total	480	3,206	0	916		
25							
26	NPV (\$B)	\$25.4	42	\$25.5	7		
27							

As can be seen in the table above, the NPV cost of the least cost Plan A in the corrected 2018 IRP is \$150 million lower than the NPV cost of the least-cost plan where the cold storage units and PP5 are available for dispatch. This model result validates that the retirements are consistent with the least-cost plan.

# 32 Q10. WHAT OTHER OBSERVATIONS WOULD YOU LIKE TO MAKE ON 33 THE TABLE ABOVE?

A10. The build plan under the least-cost plan scenario where these units are not retired
 looks substantially different than the least-cost plan in the Corrected 2018 IRP. In

fact, if these units are not retired, the Company does not need to build any resources of any kind until 2029. Over the 15-year planning period, the model only selects 916 MW of natural-gas fired combustion turbine ("CT") units. The table below summarizes the impacts on the build plan for the least-cost plan for: (1) the PJMderived load and energy forecast, and (2) the retirements of the cold reserve units and PP5.

7 8		Renewable <u>(MWs)</u>	Fossil <u>(MWs)</u>
9	Least-Cost Plan (as filed)	4,731	4,122
10 11	Least-Cost Plan (Corrected 2018 IRP)	480	3,206
12	Least-Cost Plan (No Unit Retirements)	0	916

13

First, using the PJM-derived load and energy forecast significantly lowers
the renewable MWs from 4,731 MWs to 480 MWs. Secondly, if the cold reserve
units and PP5 are not retired, then the model does not select any renewable MWs.
Likewise, the PJM-derived load and energy forecast lowers the fossil fuel
MWs from 4,122 MWs to 3,206 MWs. Additionally, if the cold reserve units and
PP5 are not retired, then the fossil fuel MWs are substantially reduced further to
just 916 MWs.

# Q11. DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON INCLUDING THESE UNIT RETIREMENTS IN THE LEAST-COST PLAN?

A11. Yes. Based on the above, Staff agrees that the unit retirements are mathematically
 part of the least-cost plan. However, the realized NPV cost savings of just \$150

1 million on a build plan with an NPV cost exceeding \$25 billion only represents a cost reduction of about 0.6%. If only one assumption is slightly changed, this 2 3 analysis may instead show that the unit retirements are no longer part of the leastcost plan.<sup>8</sup> Thus, even though the unit retirements slightly lowers the NPV costs of 4 5 the least-cost plan, Staff does not believe these savings are so compelling that it necessarily justifies retiring approximately 2,100 MWs of capacity over such a 6 short timeframe. As will be discussed later in my testimony, given the recent 7 8 volatility of current energy markets and shifting policy goals, a more conservative strategy of gradualism may be more appropriate where these unit retirements are 9 10 staggered over a longer time period.

# Q12. DID STAFF CONFIRM THAT INCLUDING THE RESULTS OF THE COMPANY'S EXTERNAL DSM ANALYSIS AS AN INPUT INTO THE PLEXOS MODEL IS PART OF THE LEAST COST PLAN?

A12. Yes. As mentioned above, the Company performed its economic analysis regarding
DSM outside of the PLEXOS model runs. In addition to the Company's existing
DSM programs, the Company included proposed DSM spending of approximately
\$298 million currently pending before the Commission in Case No. PUR-201800168 as a fixed input into the PLEXOS model. The Company performs its DSM
analysis using the Strategist model. The DSM programs selected by the Strategist
model are then included as a fixed input in the PLEXOS model.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> For example, if actual future PJM capacity and energy prices are higher than the Company's forecasts in this IRP, then the retirements may no longer be part of the least-cost plan. Staff has observed a significant amount of variability in the various forecasts used by the Company from one IRP to the next.

In order to confirm that the Company's proposed DSM programs are part of 1 the least-cost plan, Staff requested that the Company perform a PLEXOS model 2 run where the \$298 million of proposed programs are removed from the model. 3 The Company's response to Staff Interrogatory No. 21-182<sup>9</sup> shows the results of 4 this model run compared to the least-cost plan in the Corrected 2018 IRP. 5 Removing the proposed DSM programs does not have any impact on the build plan 6 as the model selects an identical set of resources as it did for the Corrected 2018 7 IRP. 8

9 The NPV cost of the least cost Plan A in the Corrected 2018 IRP is \$140 10 million lower than the NPV cost of the least-cost plan where the \$298 million of 11 proposed DSM programs are removed from the model. This model result validates 12 that the proposed DSM programs are consistent with the least-cost plan.

### 13 Q13. DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON INCLUDING THE

14

#### PROPOSE DSM PROGRAMS IN THE LEAST-COST PLAN?

A13. Yes. It should be noted that these DSM programs have not yet been approved by
the Commission. Further, the output of the Strategist model for these DSM
programs is based on the Company's planning level assumptions regarding
estimated energy savings and participation rates for the various proposed DSM
programs. Historically, after approval and implementation, actual Evaluation,
Measurement and Verification data often reveal that these planning level
assumptions are overstated. However, notwithstanding this, for purposes of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Attachment GLA-2

1		Corrected 2108 IRP which, by definition, is a planning exercise, Staff is not
2		opposed to using the Company's planning level DSM assumptions.
3		INCREMENTAL COST OF THE GTSA
4	Q14.	WHAT DID THE COMMISSION'S RE-FILE ORDER REQUIRE FOR THE
5		GTSA?
6	A14.	The Commission's Re-File Order states the following regarding the GTSA:
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14		As previously ordered, the Company shall also calculate the incremental cost impacts of the mandates contained in Senate Bill 966, including a comparison to the identified least-cost plan. This includes CVOW; 5,000 MW of nameplate wind and solar, including at least 25 percent of such resources from non-utility generators; \$870 million in spending on energy efficiency programs; the 30 MW battery storage pilot; the SUP; the Grid Transformation Plan; and the Transmission Line Undergrounding Pilot. <sup>10</sup>
15	Q15.	DID THE COMPANY CALCULATE THE INCREMENTAL COSTS OF
16		THE GTSA AS DIRECTED BY THE COMMISSION IN THE RE-FILE
17		ORDER?
18	A15.	Yes. To the extent that the mandates of the GTSA were not selected by the
19		PLEXOS model in the Corrected 2018 least-cost Plan A, the Company performed
20		a PLEXOS model run in which they forced the model to select the mandates of the
21		GTSA. The Company presents these model results as Plan F in the Corrected 2018
22		IRP, hereinafter referred to as the GTSA Plan. Table 1 of the Corrected 2018 IRP
23		presents a summary of the NPV costs for all plans and calculates the incremental

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Re-File Order at 5 (internal footnotes omitted).

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NPV cost of the GTSA Plan to be \$5.81 billion higher than the NPV cost of Plan A.

# 3 Q16. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS REGARDING THE \$870 MILLION IN 4 DSM SPENDING FOR THE GTSA PLAN?

A16. Yes. Staff notes that \$298 million of proposed DSM programs are already included 5 in Plan A, the least cost plan. As mentioned, the Company counts spending on 6 7 these proposed programs towards the \$870 million mandate contained in the GTSA. As such, the GTSA Plan only reflects an additional \$572 million of DSM spending. 8 Furthermore, the \$298 million of spending on the proposed DSM programs is 9 inclusive of lost revenues. Since the remaining \$572 million of generic DSM 10 contained in the GTSA Plan was developed based on prior DSM programs, lost 11 revenues are also implicitly included as a component of the \$572 million. To the 12 extent that lost revenues are a program cost that count towards the \$870 million 13 mandate contained in the GTSA, this will result in less actual DSM measures being 14 deployed and less energy load reduction than would occur otherwise. 15

16 Staff does not take a position at this time on whether lost revenues should 17 be a component of the \$870 million mandate contained in the GTSA.<sup>11</sup> 18 Furthermore, Staff does not take a position on whether the \$298 million of proposed 19 DSM programs, which have not been developed pursuant to the stakeholder process 20 required by the GTSA, should count toward the \$870 million mandate contained in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> DEV has recently made public comments that the Company is now committed to propose an aggregate total of \$870 million in regulated energy efficiency spending through 2028 exclusive of any counting of projected or actual lost revenues. This has no bearing on the modeling performed for the Corrected 2018 IRP which includes lost revenues as a component of the \$870 million.

the GTSA. Staff does note, however, that both assumptions by the Company result
 in less incremental DSM spending on actual DSM measures in the GTSA Plan and
 accordingly less energy load reduction.

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### Q17. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS REGARDING SOLAR RESOURCES CONTAINED IN THE GTSA PLAN?

A17. As directed by the Commission, and consistent with the GTSA, the GTSA Plan 6 7 modeled solar assuming 25% of the required solar would be PPAs and 75% would be Company-build. Since the solar PPA option is much lower in cost compared to 8 the Company-build option, this lowers the overall cost of solar resources in the 9 Corrected 2018 IRP compared to the 2018 IRP as originally filed, which modeled 10 100% of solar resources as Company-build. Staff would further note, that including 11 a higher percentage of solar PPAs toward the 5,000 MW of wind/solar mandate 12 would lower the incremental cost of the GTSA Plan. It is unclear if the requirement 13 in the GTSA that 25% of solar be PPAs is a floor or an exact percentage that cannot 14 be exceeded. However, in planning space, Staff recommends that the Company 15 perform sensitivity model runs in future IRPs that assume 50%, 75%, and 100%, 16 17 respectively, of solar resources as solar PPAs.

# Q18. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ON THE COMPANY INCLUDING THE BENEFITS OF THE GRID TRANSFORMATION ("GT") PLAN IN THE INCREMENTAL NPV COST ANALYSIS?

A18. The benefits shown in Table 1 of the Corrected 2018 IRP for the GT Plan were first
 presented to the Commission in Case No. PUR-2018-00100, the Company's first

1application for approval of a proposed GT Plan. The Commission's Final Order in2that case did not approve most of the elements contained in the proposed GT Plan.<sup>12</sup>3Further, the Final Order did not address the adequacy of the Company's benefit4estimates. In that case, Staff found that the Company's estimates of quantifiable5benefits related to the GT Plan appeared to be unsupported to some degree and/or6overstated.

Based on the above, the Company's estimate of the benefits of the GT Plan
shown in Table 1 of the Corrected 2018 IRP should be viewed as a Company
number for informational purposes only. This benefit estimate was not supported
by Staff and was not explicitly addressed by the Commission in its Final Order in
Case No. PUR-2018-00100 that rejected most of the proposed GT Plan.

12 Staff further notes that the costs of the GT Plan, and all other cost items 13 contained in Table 1 of the Corrected 2018 IRP will be collected from ratepayers 14 in the form of higher bills, primarily through rate adjustment clauses ("RACs"). 15 However, to the extent that these GT Plan benefits exist, the benefits will not impact 16 the calculation of customer bills or ameliorate the cost impact of the GT Plan on 17 customer bills.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> The Commission did approve the Cyber and Physical Security category and some of the Telecommunications elements of the proposed GT Plan. See Petition of Virginia Electric and Power Company, For approval of a plan for electric distribution grid transformation projects pursuant to § 56-585.1 A 6 of the Code of Virginia, Case No. PUR-2018-00100, Doc. Con. Cen. No. 190130074, Final Order (Jan. 17, 2019).

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1		SOLAR RESOURCE PERFORMANCE AND CAPACITY FACTORS
2	Q19.	DID THE COMPANY USE A 23% CAPACITY FACTOR FOR SOLAR
3.		RESOURCES AS DIRECTED BY THE COMMISSION IN ITS RE-FILE
4		ORDER?
5	A19.	Yes.
6	Q20.	DOES THE COMPANY AGREE THAT A CAPACITY FACTOR OF 23%
7		IS APPROPRIATE FOR SOLAR RESOURCES?
8	A20.	No. In the March 7, 2019 letter submitting the Corrected 2018 IRP, the Company
9		respectfully disagrees with the requirement that the Company's modeling include a
10		23% capacity factor for future solar development. The Company states that the
11		25.4% capacity factor used in the 2018 IRP as originally filed is a supported and
12		supportable assumption for solar resources.
13	Q21.	DOES STAFF AGREE WITH THE COMPANY'S CONTENTION THAT
14		25.4% IS THE CORRECT CAPACITY FACTOR TO USE FOR SOLAR
15		RESOURCES?
16	A21.	No, not based on the actual historic performance of solar resources in Virginia and
17		North Carolina in general, and not based on the historic performance of DEV's
18		Company-build solar resources in particular.
19	Q22.	WHAT IS THE HISTORIC TRACK RECORD FOR SOLAR RESOURCES
20		IN THE COMPANY'S VIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA SERVICE
21		TERRITORIES?

A22. This issue has already been discussed extensively in Staff's prior pre-filed
testimony regarding the 2018 IRP as originally filed and at the September 24, 2018
public hearing. To obtain updated information following the filing of the Corrected
2018 IRP, Staff Interrogatory No. 19-177 requested that the Company update its
response to Staff Interrogatory No. 2-18(d) to reflect solar capacity factors for solar
facilities in the Company's Virginia and North Carolina service territories through
the end of calendar year 2018.

In my prior pre-filed testimony in this case, I reported that the actual observed utility-specific data over the five-year period 2013-2017 for the Company's owned and operated solar resources in Virginia showed an actual capacity factor of 19.4%. Further, third-party contract solar facilities dispatched by the Company, which are predominately located in North Carolina, experienced an actual capacity factor of 20.3% over the five-year period 2013-2017.

The Company's response to Staff Interrogatory No. 19-177 (Attachment GLA-2) shows that the average capacity factor for the Company's owned and operated solar resources in Virginia decreased from 19.4% over the five-year period 2013-2017 to 18.3% over the six-year period 2013-2018. Further, for third-party contract solar facilities dispatched by the Company, which are predominately located in North Carolina, the average capacity factor has decreased from 20.3% over the five-year period 2013-2017 to 19.8% over the six-year period 2013-2018.

The historic record updated to include calendar year 2018 shows that average solar capacity factors have gotten worse. Based on observed actual data, . Staff does not believe it is appropriate to base a long-term investment strategy for

solar resources on the Company's suggested 25.4% capacity factor. Actual
 performance matters and underperformance has real, as opposed to hypothetical,
 negative consequences for ratepayers.

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#### Q23. PLEASE EXPAND ON THAT POINT.

5 A23. This can best be demonstrated by the performance of the Company's three existing 6 US-2 solar tracking facilities – Whitehouse, Scott, and Woodland. The Company 7 represented to the Commission that these facilities would have an average capacity 8 factor of 25% when seeking approval of a Certificate of Public Convenience and 9 Necessity ("CPCN") for these facilities. As shown in Attachment GLA-2, none of 10 these facilities have come close to a 25% capacity factor. In 2018, the Scott facility 11 only achieved a capacity factor of 13.7%.

This poor performance for the US-2 solar tracking facilities is primarily due 12 to a host of operational issues that have plagued these facilities since they became 13 14 operational. The Company's confidential response to Staff Interrogatory No. 19-178 (Attachment GLA-3) updated the outage history for each of DEV's Company-15 build solar facilities in Virginia through February 2019. Of particular concern, the 16 17 Whitehouse US-2 solar facility was off-line from [begin confidential] [end confidential] days straight. This is 18 19 particularly troublesome because the PJM coincident peak occurs in the summer 20 and the Whitehouse US-2 solar facility was off-line for much of the summer.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Staff notes that the US-2 RAC jurisdictional and class cost allocation utilizes the Company's average and excess demand allocator. The outage history of the US-2 solar facilities raises questions as to the appropriateness of treating these facilities the same as traditional generating resources for cost allocation purposes.

1		Even more troubling is the recent non-performance of the Scott US-2
2		facility which has only been operational for [begin confidential]
3		confidential] over the September 1, 2018 through February 28, 2019 period. The
4		Scott US-2 solar facility has been off-line for [begin confidential]
5		confidential] days consecutively through February 28, 2019.
6	Q24.	HOW DOES THE POOR PERFORMANCES OF THE US-2 SOLAR
7		FACILITIES RESULT IN NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR
8		RATEPAYERS?
9	A24.	The US-2 RAC is currently pending before the Commission in Case No. PUR-
10		2018-00167. The negative impact on ratepayers was displayed in the pre-filed
11		supplemental testimony of Staff witness Samuel in that case. The following table
12		from Staff witness Samuel's supplemental testimony demonstrating the negative
13		consequences to ratepayers is reproduced below.

		<u>Company Factor 1</u>						
	<u>T</u>	<b>Total Actual Revenue</b>		rice paid per	alue of PJM Energy			
	<u>R</u>	<u>equirement for 2017</u>	<u>M'</u>	WH Generated	<u>j</u>	Purchases Avoided	N	et Cost
<u>Residential</u>	\$	6,288,005	\$	150.95	\$	34.07	\$	116.87
<u>GS-1</u>	\$	613,260	\$	119.42	\$	34.07	\$	85.35
<u>GS-2</u>	\$	1,779,288	\$	106.97	\$	34.07	\$	72.90
<u>GS-3</u>	\$	1,681,192	\$	89.65	\$	34.07	\$	55.57
<u>GS-4</u>	\$	926,757	\$	73.96	\$	34.07	\$	39.88
Special Contract	\$	69,495	\$	121.27	\$	34.07	\$	87.20
<u>Churches</u>	\$	54,516	\$	160.63	\$	34.07	\$	126.56
<b>Outdoor Lighting</b>	\$	19,486	\$	137.67	\$	34.07	\$	103.60
<u>Total</u>	\$	11,432,000	\$	119.38	\$	34.07	\$	85.30

In 2017, the actual capacity factors were 20.4%, 20.4%, and 16.7%, respectively,

for the Whitehouse, Scott, and Woodland US-2 solar facilities. Since the ratepayers

must pay the full revenue requirement regardless of how much energy is produced, 1 2 the poor performances of the US-2 solar facilities result in ratepayers paying an average of \$119.38 per MWh. This is more than triple the average PJM energy 3 4 price of \$34.07 per MWh if the energy had instead been procured from the PJM energy market during the hours of the US-2 facilities' energy production. This cost 5 premium is even more stark for some rate classes because the Company allocates 6 7 costs using the average and excess demand allocator. Residential customers pay \$150.95 per MWh, which is more than quadruple the average PJM energy price of 8 \$34.07. 9 Staff notes that in 2018, the actual performance of the US-2 solar facilities 10 has continued to deteriorate. The actual capacity factors were 16.2%, 13.7%, and 11 19.1%, respectively, for the Whitehouse, Scott, and Woodland US-2 solar facilities. 12 13 Thus, the cost per MWh for next year's US-2 RAC filing will be even more prohibitively expensive. 14 SOLAR PPA VERSUS COMPANY-BUILD SOLAR 15 HOW DOES THE COST OF THE SOLAR PPA OPTION COMPARE TO 16 **O25**. THE COST OF THE COMPANY-BUILD SOLAR OPTION? 17 A25. This is demonstrated by examining the record in Case No. PUR-2018-00101 for 18 approval of CPCNs for the two US-3 solar projects which showed that solar PPAs 19 20 were a lower cost option. The LCOE for a 20-year solar PPA was approximately

\$41 per MWh compared to approximately \$61 per MWh for the US-3 Companybuild solar projects. It should be noted that the Company represented that these
two US-3 solar tracking facilities will achieve an average capacity factor of

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approximately 28% and the calculated cost per MWh for the US-3 facilities assumes that capacity factor will be achieved.

#### 026. DOES A SOLAR PPA SUBJECT THE RATEPAYERS TO THE SAME 3 PERFORMANCE RISK AS A COMPANY-BUILD SOLAR FACILITY? 4 A26. No. Under a solar PPA, DEV and its ratepayers only pay for the actual energy 5 produced. All performance risk is borne by the non-utility solar generator. In fact, 6 these solar PPA contracts usually have provisions where the non-utility generator 7 must pay a non-performance penalty to the utility for extended outages like the ones 8 discussed earlier that occurred at the Company's Whitehouse and Scott US-2 solar 9 facilities in 2018. 10 In sharp contrast, under the Company-build option, DEV is entitled to 11 collect its full revenue requirement regardless of actual performance. Thus, all 12

13 performance risk is borne by the Company's ratepayers.<sup>14</sup>

# Q27. DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS COMPARING THE SOLAR PPA OPTION TO THE COMPANY-BUILD SOLAR OPTION?

A27. Yes. Under the solar PPA option, the costs paid for the energy received is flowed
 to ratepayers through the fuel factor. As such, all rate classes pay the same price
 per MWh received from the solar facility. Under the Company-build solar option,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> In Case No. PUR-2018-00101, the Commission approved CPCNs for the two US-3 solar tracking facilities conditioned on a performance guarantee where the Company guarantees a 25% capacity factor for 20 years. To the extent actual performance falls below 25% in a given year, then the Company will provide the energy and solar REC revenue for such shortfall at zero cost to ratepayers. In this way, some but not all of the performance risk is borne by the Company's shareholders.

the revenue requirement is allocated to the various customer classes using the
Company's average and excess demand allocator which results in the residential
class paying a substantially higher price per MWh compared to the large
commercial and industrial classes.

#### 5 Q28. WHAT ARE YOUR CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE SOLAR PPA

#### 6 OPTION VERSUS THE COMPANY-BUILD SOLAR OPTION?

- 7 A28. Staff reaches the following conclusions:
- The solar PPA option is substantially less costly than the Company-build solar option;
- The solar PPA option is competitive with the PJM energy market and the Company-build solar option is not competitive;
- Under the solar PPA option, all performance risk is borne by the non-utility solar generator;
- Under the Company-build solar option, the performance risk is borne by DEV's ratepayers, absent a performance guarantee;
- Residential and small commercial customers are particularly better off
   under the solar PPA option given that costs are allocated on an energy basis
   and all rate classes pay the same price per MWh; and
- The solar PPA option is superior to the Company-build option.
- 20 <u>GENERATING UNIT RETIREMENT ANALYSIS</u>

#### 21 Q29. DO YOU HAVE ANY GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE GENERATING

- 22 UNIT RETIREMENT ANALYSIS PERFORMED BY THE COMPANY FOR
- 23 THIS IRP AND PRIOR RETIREMENT DECISIONS?
- A29. Yes. The Company is not required to seek approval from the Commission to retire
- 25 its generating units. However, the Company does need approval from the

Commission for CPCNs for new generating units or transmission projects that may 1 be required to replace the capacity that was retired so that the Company can satisfy 2 its capacity obligation required by PJM or to correct for transmission reliability 3 issues that may arise from the retirement. Thus, the prudency of the retirement 4 decision for a given generating unit may be an issue during the CPCN proceeding 5 6 for this replacement capacity or for any required transmission improvements. Staff notes, however, that once a generating unit is retired, as a practical matter, it cannot 7 be brought back. So, even if, during the CPCN proceeding for the replacement 8 capacity, it was determined that the retirement decision was imprudent, the retired 9 unit cannot be placed back into service. Staff believes that the only forum where 10 unit retirement decisions can be analyzed before the Company makes a final 11 decision on retirement is an IRP proceeding. 12

Additionally, the Company performs its retirement analysis for a given generating unit as if the generating unit was a merchant plant operating in PJM. This may not be the most appropriate approach given that DEV is a vertically integrated utility that owns generating units that are backstopped by its captive ratepayers.

#### 18 **Q30**.

#### WHY DOES THE COMPANY'S MARKET STRUCTURE MATTER?

A30. Most generating units operating in PJM are merchant plants. When the projected
revenues received from the PJM energy and capacity markets can no longer cover
the variable O&M costs of the unit, the owner of the merchant plant will notify PJM
that the unit is retiring. To the extent that there is undepreciated book value left on
the books, the merchant plant's owners/shareholders bear that cost. The merchant

plant owner is not obligated to mitigate any transmission system costs that may be
caused due to the generating unit shutdown. The merchant plant owner is not
responsible for paying for any replacement capacity. The merchant plant owner
does not have any obligation to consider the broader public interest of the unit
retirement decision.

6 As a vertically integrated utility that owns distribution, transmission, and 7 generation assets, DEV: (1) is guaranteed recovery of any undepreciated book value 8 associated with a unit retirement; (2) is responsible for mitigating transmission 9 system costs that may be required due to a unit retirement; (3) is responsible for 10 procuring replacement capacity to meet its load obligation to PJM; and (4) should, 11 in Staff's opinion, consider the overall public interest including negative impacts to 12 the local county and broader Virginia economies associated with a unit retirement.

## Q31. WHAT IS THE REMAINING NET BOOK VALUE ASSOCIATED WITH THE 2,100 MW OF UNIT RETIREMENTS?

A31. Staff witness Myers discusses this in her pre-filed testimony. Her testimony
 identifies the remaining net book value of these units in the amount of \$330.2
 million as of December 31, 2018. All of this will be recovered from ratepayers.

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### Q32. HOW MUCH REPLACEMENT CAPACITY IS PROJECTED TO BE REQUIRED TO MEET THE COMPANY'S CAPACITY OBLIGATION TO PJM OVER THE 15-YEAR PLANNING PERIOD?

A32. As discussed earlier in my testimony, the retirement of 2,100 MW associated with
 these units will require an additional 2,290 MW of natural gas-fired CT units and

480 MW of solar PPAs over the 15-year planning period. Essentially, the
 ratepayers pay for this capacity twice, first to recover the remaining net book value
 of these units in base rates, and secondly to recover the costs of the replacement
 capacity which will be predominately through RACs.

# 5 Q33. HAVE ANY OF THESE UNIT RETIREMENTS CAUSED TRANSMISSION 6 ISSUES THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED?

7 A33. Yes. In Case No. PUR-2018-00159, the Company is seeking approval of a CPCN to construct \$27.2 million<sup>15</sup> of transmission facilities to resolve potential violations 8 of North American Electric Reliability Corporation ("NERC") reliability standards 9 10 related to the Company's decision to deactivate and place into cold storage the Company's Bremo Power Station Units 3 and 4. Given the Company's recent 11 12 announcement to retire these units, these units cannot be brought back on line. This 13 transmission cost was not included in the Company's cost-benefit analysis for these units. This avoided transmission cost should have been included as a benefit of 14 keeping these units in service prior to making a final decision on retirement.<sup>16</sup> 15

# Q34. DID THE COMPANY PERFORM ANY ANALYSIS ON THE IMPACT TO THE LOCAL ECONOMY AND THE VIRGINIA ECONOMY BEFORE MAKING ITS DECISION TO RETIRE THESE UNITS?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Consisting of \$5.4 million for transmission work and \$21.8 million for substation-related work. In addition, the Company had to deploy a temporary fix in the form of a Temporary Transformer for \$2,049,679. In total, the Company's decision to deactivate and retire Bremo Units 3 and 4 results in over \$29 million of transmission costs that would not have been necessary absent these retirements.
<sup>16</sup> Staff is aware that the Company is subject to Code of Conduct requirements that prevents the generation planning side of the Company from communicating with the transmission planning side of the Company. However, prior to placing these units into cold storage, the transmission problems were known publicly and should have been included in the cost-benefit analysis prior to making a final decision on retirement of these units.

A34. No, not to Staff's knowledge. The closure of these plants will result in a significant 1 2 loss of jobs, payroll, spending, and county property taxes in the local counties where the units are located which will ripple throughout the broader Virginia 3 economy due to the multiplier effect. Staff notes that the Company often will 4 perform an analysis on the positive economic impact associated with a generating 5 unit that it proposes to build to justify its approval as part of the broader public 6 7 interest. Staff believes such an analysis should also be performed before the 8 Company makes a final decision to retire a generating unit.

## 9 Q35. DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON THE COMPANY'S 10 RETIREMENT ANALYSIS?

A35. Yes. As I discussed earlier in my testimony, the Company's PLEXOS model run 11 performed in response to Staff discovery showed that the decision to retire the 2,100 12 MW of generating units lowered the NPV cost over the 25-year study period by 13 \$150 million, or 0.6% cost savings, on a build plan with a NPV cost exceeding \$25 14 billion. This amount of cost savings does not make a compelling case to retire these 15 units. The negative impacts to the local counties' and broader Virginia economies 16 may not be warranted for just a 0.6% potential cost savings that may be achieved 17 from the unit retirements. Further, despite the Company's positive cost-benefit 18 analysis, the immediate impact to customers will be higher monthly bills. 19

# Q36. WHY WILL CUSTOMER BILLS INCREASE IN THE NEAR TERM DUE TO THE RETIREMENT OF THESE GENERATING UNITS?

The costs of the replacement capacity will predominately be recovered through 1 A36. RACs that will immediately show up on the customer bill upon approval by the 2 Commission. The benefits of the generating unit retirements come in the form of 3 avoided variable O&M costs from operating the retiring units which are booked to 4 base rates. Since all these retiring generating units are in base rates, the customer 5 6 will not see any immediate reduction in their bills due to these cost savings. Rather, in the near term, these benefits go to the shareholders until which time that they 7 eventually trickle down to customers most likely in the form of higher customer 8 credit offsets than might otherwise be expected. 9

# Q37. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINAL COMMENTS ON THE COMPANY'S DECISION TO RETIRE 2,100 MW OF GENERATING CAPACITY?

A37. Notwithstanding the concerns outlined above, given the recent volatility of current
 energy markets and shifting policy goals, a more conservative strategy of
 gradualism may be more appropriate where these unit retirements are staggered
 over a longer time-period. A review of past IRPs reveals that current markets have
 been extremely volatile and dynamic with significant swings in commodity prices,
 PJM capacity prices, PJM energy prices, the capital cost of solar resources, etc.

It is often said that an IRP is a snapshot in time. While this is true, it is instructive to look back at the prior IRP snapshots to inform decision-making based on the current snapshot. Staff believes such a review indicates that a more cautious gradual approach is more prudent as the technology that is least cost today may not be in the next IRP and the plans that the Company presents from one IRP to the next also vary greatly reflecting this market reality.

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Long term planning in these volatile markets is exacerbated by significant shifts in public policy goals from government policymakers that have occurred in recent years.

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### Q38. HOW HAVE SHIFTS IN PUBLIC POLICY GOALS COMPLICATED LONG-TERM UTILITY PLANNING?

A38. This can best be demonstrated by comparing and contrasting the policy goals
contained in the 2007 Regulation Act and the possibility of Virginia linking to
RGGI.

The 2007 Regulation Act declared that a new coal-fired generation unit 9 located in southwest Virginia to be in the public interest. Additionally, the 2007 10 11 Regulation Act provided for an enhanced rate of return for fossil fuel generating plants to provide an incentive for utilities to construct fossil fuel generating units in 12 Virginia. Not surprisingly, given the enhanced rate of return, DEV constructed 13 14 several large fossil fuel generating units. The table below shows the fossil fuel generating units that were constructed by the Company pursuant to the 2007 15 Regulation Act and the enhanced return each plant received. 16

<u>Rider</u>	Generating Station(s)	<u>B.P.</u> Incentive	<u>Term</u>	<u>Initial Case</u>
S	VCHEC (Coal)	100	12	PUE-2007-00066
R	Bear Garden (Gas)	100	10	PUE-2009-00017
В	Biomasss Conversions - Altavista, Southampton, Hopewell	200	5	PUE-2011-00073
W	Warren (Gas)	100	10	PUE-2011-00042
BW	Brunswick (Gas)	100	. 10	PUE-2012-00128
GV	Greensville (Gas)	n/a	n/a	PUE-2015-00075

In response to the policy goals contained in the 2007 Regulation Act, the Company developed a significant portfolio of coal and natural gas generation units. The Company's ratepayers are still paying an enhanced rate of return on several of these fossil fuel units.

In 2019, public policy goals shifted dramatically. In accordance with 5 former Governor McAuliffe's Executive Directive 11, the Virginia Department of 6 Environmental Quality ("DEO") developed its final proposed rule emissions cap 7 8 for Virginia of 28 million tons beginning in 2020 which decreases 3% per year through 2030, as proposed in Virginia State Air Pollution Control Board regulations 9 currently under review. DEQ's proposed RGGI rule envisions Virginia linking to 10 11 RGGI. RGGI is a government-imposed cap and trade mechanism designed to impose a carbon tax on the use of fossil fuel generation. Essentially, RGGI levies 12 a carbon tax on fossil fuel generation, payable by electric generators in each RGGI 13 state, with the goal of making fossil fuel generation less competitive, thus leading 14 to reductions in fossil fuel generation and corresponding reductions in CO<sub>2</sub> 15 emissions. 16

These conflicting government policy goals will result in customers paying the Company an enhanced rate of return, or profit, for fossil fuel generating units which will now be subject to a tax designed to keep these generating units from running. In other words, DEV's customers will be paying the Company an extra profit on fossil fuel plants while simultaneously paying a carbon tax when these units are dispatched.

#### 1 DEV 2019 INVESTOR DAY PRESENTATION

Q 39. HAS THE COMPANY MADE ANY RECENT PUBLIC
ANNOUNCEMENTS ABOUT ITS INVESTMENT PLANS THAT ARE NOT
PRESENTED IN OR SUPPORTED BY THE 2018 IRP AS ORIGINALLY
FILED OR IN THE CORRECTED 2018 IRP?

A39. Yes. On March 25, 2019, DEV made a presentation to the New York Stock
Exchange that announced plans to move forward with \$17 billion of capital
investment in Virginia for the 2019 through 2023 period ("2019 Capital Investment
Announcement").

## Q40. HOW DOES THIS 2019 CAPITAL INVESTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT DIFFER FROM THE BUILD PLANS PRESENTED IN THE 2018 IRP?

12 A40. The Company's \$17 billion capital investment strategy presented in the 2019 Capital Investment Announcement is significantly different from the Plans 13 14 presented in the Company's 2018 IRP as originally filed and the Corrected 2018 IRP. Staff Interrogatory No. 21-186 requested that the Company identify how 15 much of this \$17 billion is included in each of the Corrected 2018 IRP Plans A 16 17 through F, and how much of this spending is not reflected in each of the corrected 18 2018 IRP Plans A through F. The Company's response provided a table with the requested information reproduced below. 19

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					Plan A		Plans B to F		Plans B to F
			Plan A	201	8 Compliance	20	8 Compliance	2	018 Compliance
	Investor Day	20:	18 Compliance Filing		Filing		Filing		Filing
	(2019 · 2023		(2019 - 2023)	(	2019 - 2043)		2019-2023)		(2019-2043)
Transmission	\$ 4.30	\$	•	\$	•	\$	0.172 1	\$	0.172
Solar	\$ 3.70	\$	•	\$	•	\$	2.20	S	6.80
Customer Growth <sup>4</sup>	\$ 1.70	\$	-	\$	•	\$	•	5	•
Grid Transformation	\$ 1.60	\$	-	\$	•	\$	1.321 <sup>2</sup>	\$	2,219
Nuclear Relicensing	\$ 1.20	\$	2.10	\$	3.40	\$	2.10	\$	3.40
Offshore Wind	\$ 1.10	\$	•	\$	-	\$	0.30	\$	0.30
Pumped Storage	\$ 1.00	\$	•	\$	•	\$	-	\$	•
Strategic Undergrounding	\$ 0.80	\$	•	\$	-	\$	.899 3	\$	1.398
Environmental	\$ 0.50	\$	0.50	\$	0.50	\$	0.50	\$	0.50
Renewable-enabling CTs	\$ 0.50	\$	0.77	\$	4.90	\$	0.77	\$	4.80
	S 16.40							1	

Notes: Unless otherwise noted, the values are in nominal dollars. 1) Plans B to F include UG Pilot #1 as shown in the 2018 Compliance Filing. The value is in 2018 dollars.

2) This value is in 2018 dollars. Converting it to nominal dollars yields a total cost of \$1.6 billion, matching the investor day presentation value.
 3) This value is in 2018 dollars. Converting it to nominal dollars yields a total cost of \$0.8 billion, matching the investor day presentation value. Included costs for the Strategic Undergrounding Program are from 2016 - 2023.
 4) Customer growth includes distribution infrastructure and growth of future customer spend. This was not analyzed in the Compliance Filling.

1		When compared to the Corrected 2018 IRP Plans B through F, among other
2		things, the Company's \$17 billion capital investment strategy over 2019-2023
3		contains significantly higher investments in Company-build solar (\$3.70 billion
4		compared to \$2.20 billion), Offshore Wind (\$1.1 billion compared to \$0.30 billion),
5		and Pumped Storage (\$1.00 billion compared \$0).
6 7	Q41.	PLEASE DISCUSS THE INCREASE IN INVESTMENT FOR COMPANY-
8		BUILD SOLAR OVER THE 2019 THROUGH 2023 PERIOD.
9	A41.	
9 10	A41.	
-	A41.	Despite the fact that the Corrected 2018 IRP clearly shows that solar PPAs are both
10	A41.	Despite the fact that the Corrected 2018 IRP clearly shows that solar PPAs are both a lower cost option and that the non-utility solar generator bears all of the

1 This is troubling to Staff given the Company's dismal historic track record 2 operating DEV's existing Company-build solar facilities. Rather than slowing 3 down until the Company can demonstrate that it can efficiently operate its 4 Company-build solar facilities, DEV apparently is planning to accelerate spending 5 on solar regardless of actual performance.

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### Q42. PLEASE DISCUSS THE INCREASE IN INVESTMENT FOR OFFSHORE WIND OVER THE 2019 THROUGH 2023 PERIOD.

A42. The \$1.1 billion planned investment in Offshore Wind identified in the Company's
2019 Capital Investment Announcement is significantly higher than the \$300
million CVOW Offshore Wind Demonstration Project. The Commission's Final
Order in Case No. PUR-2018-00101 approved the prudency determination for
CVOW. Importantly, the Company represented in that case that CVOW was
needed to gather information before the Company could make any determination
regarding a larger scale investment in offshore wind.

It now appears, based on the Company's 2019 Capital Investment Announcement, that the Company has determined that it does not need to get the results from the CVOW demonstration before planning for an investment in a broader deployment of offshore wind. This begs the question of why CVOW is needed if the Company is not going to wait to get the results of the demonstration project.

# Q43. PLEASE DISCUSS THE COMPANY'S PLANS FOR A BILLION DOLLAR INVESTMENT IN PUMPED STORAGE.

A43. Not only has a pumped storage facility not been included in any of the plans
presented in the 2018 IRP or any prior IRP, the Company has also not presented
any cost data in the 2018 IRP or any prior IRP concerning a pumped storage facility.
Given the Company's Capital Investment Announcement of a \$1 billion planned
investment in pumped storage, it appears that the Company has developed plans
and cost estimates for this resource but has chosen to not include this information
in its IRP filings before the Commission.

# 8 Q44. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINAL COMMENTS ON THE COMPANY'S 9 CAPITAL INVESTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT?

10 A44. Yes. Staff notes that there are drastically different visions for the next five years contained in the Company's 2019 Capital Investment Announcement compared to 11 the 2018 IRP. In Staff's view, this raises questions of whether the IRP is driving 12 the Company's investment strategy, or the Company's investment strategy is driving 13 the Company's planning process. It appears that the latter may be the case. This 14 raises further questions of whether the Company is backing into the results 15 contained in its IRPs to support announcements to Wall Street like the Company's 16 2019 Capital Investment Announcement. 17

#### 18 **RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE IRP FILINGS**

#### 19 Q45. WHAT ARE YOR RECOMMENDATIONS?

20 A45. Staff makes the following recommendations for future IRP filings:

• Staff recommends that the Company base future build plans presented in future IRP filings on the PJM-derived peak load and energy sales forecast

scaled down to the Dominion load serving entity level as described by Staff
 witness White. If it chooses, the Company can also use its internal peak
 load and energy sales forecast as a sensitivity run.

- Staff recommends that the Company use a 23% capacity factor for solar resources in future IRP filings,<sup>17</sup> consistent with the Commission's directive in its Re-File Order. In addition, Staff recommends that the Company provide build plans using a 20% solar capacity factor as a sensitivity run or actual if the actual historic average capacity factor is higher 20%. If it so chooses, the Company can also use its projected solar capacity factor as a sensitivity run.
- Staff recommends, in future IRP filings, that the Company model solar
   resources using 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% as solar PPAs, respectively.

#### 13 Q46. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?

14 A46. Yes, it does.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> The Re-File Order directed a solar capacity factor of 23%. In selecting the 23 percent capacity factor, the Commission stated in the Re-File Order that it weighed evidence regarding the causes of the actual solar capacity factors and evidence supporting technological efficiency improvements of solar resources over time. Thus, 23% represents a balancing of actual historic performance and expected improvements in solar technology going forward. Based on the record herein, the Commission may determine that a different capacity factor is appropriate for the next IRP filing.

### ATTACHMENT GLA-1

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### 2018 IRP Refile - 23.0% Solar Capacity Factor, PJM Load Forecast Plan A Staff Set 21-183

No CO2 Base

No CO2 - No Cold Stroage/PP5 Retirements

	N. MARTIN, A. M. THER. CONTACT, N. THERE SHARES BAR.	a to pay two transforms to the second payments when	Building and a finite state of the state of	
	Renewable MWs,	Fossil MWŝ	Rénewable MWs	Fossil MWs
2018	-	-	-	-
2019	-	-	-	-
2020	160	-	-	-
2021	160	-	-	` <b>-</b>
2022	160	458	-	-
2023	-	458	-	-
2024	-	458	-	-
2025	-	458	-	-
2026	-	-	-	-
2027	-	-	-	-
2028	-	458	-	-
2029	-	-	-	458
2030	-	-	-	-
2031	-	458	-	458
2032	-	-	/ -	-
2033	-	458	-	-
Total	480	3,206	-	916
2034	-	-	-	458
2035	-	-	-	-
2036	-	458	-	-
2037	-	-	-	458
2038	-	458	-	-
2039	-	-	-	-
2040	-	-	-	458
2041	-	458	-	-
2042	-	-	80	458
2043	-	458	-	-
Total	480	5,038	80	2,748
	\$	25.42		\$ 25.57
				\$0.15

Notes:

NPV (\$B)

Cold Storage units removed from cold storage and allowed to operate during study period. Possum Point 5 retirement removed and allowed to operate during study period

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### ATTACHMENT GLA-2

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Staff.Sct.19-127: Undetc.19 Attachment Staff.Sct.2-18(d) (IMB)

				Average An	nual Capac	ity Factors <sup>1</sup>		
	COD Year	2013	2014	_2015	2016	2017	2018	Average
Company Owned Solar Facilities: Morgan's Corner	2015				19.2%	19.6%	16.2%	18.3%
Whitehouse	2016					20.4%	16.2%	18.3%
Scott	2016					20.4%	13.7%	17.1%
Woodland	2016					16.7%	19.1%	17.9%
Remington	2017						20.3%	20.3%
Oceana	2017						17.8%	17.8%
Holyfield	2018							N/A
Pullor	2018							N/A
Pecan	2018							N/A
Montross	2018							N/A
Solar Partnurship Program	Varios2					13.5%	0.7%	7.1%
Third-Party Contract Solar Facilities (NUGs):	i							
Plymouth Solar	2012	17.5%	20.3%	18,5%	20.3%	20.5%	20.6%	19.6%
Bethel Price Solar	2014			24,7%	21.1%	15.4%	16.1%	19.3%
Dogwood Solar	2014			22.0%	23.4%	24.0%	20.2%	22.4%
HXOap Solar	2014			15.4%	17.1%	9.8%	19.1%	15.4%
Jakana Solar	2014			21.5%	21.4%	22.6%	20.5%	21.5%
Lowiston Solar	2014			18.6%	23.0%	21.8%	20.5%	21.0%
Williamston Solar	2014			21.2%	23.3%	22.6%	20.6%	21.9%
Windsor Solar	2014			21.6%	22,4%	22.3%	21.3%	21.9%
S10 REPP One Solar	2015				17.7%	13.1%	17.1%	16.0%
Creswell Aligoud Solar Downs Farm Solar	2015				24.2%	25.2%	25.0%	24,8%
Downs Farm Solar Everetts Wildcat Solar	2015 2015				17.6%	19.3% 25.3%	19.6% 24.5%	18.8%
GKS Solar- SolNCZ	2015				24.0% 20.7%	25.3% 18.9%	24.5% 19.3%	24,6%
GRS Solar- SolNC2	2015				20.7%	24.7%		19.7% 22.5%
SolNCPower6 Solar	2015				21.7%	29.7%	22.8% 24.6%	23.8%
Tarboro Solar	2015				17.4%	25,1%	24.6%	23.8%
Two Mile Desert Road - SolNC1	2015				19.9%	20.6%	20.0%	20.2%
Windsor Cooper Hill Solar	2015	1			9.6%	18.7%	19.1%	15.8%
Aulandar Hwy 42 Solar	2016					14.9%	22.3%	18.6%
Barnhill Road Solar	2016					21.6%	21.0%	21.3%
Battleboro Farm Solar	2016					20.2%	18.2%	19.2%
Battleboro Solar	2016					20.6%	20.2%	20.4%
Bethol Solar (Strata)	2016					22.3%	19.6%	20.9%
Bradley PVI- FAE IX	2016					12.9%	18.2%	15.6%
Conetoo Solar	2016					22.6%	23.3%	23.0%
FAE X -Shawboro	2016					21.9%	21.7%	21.8%
FAE XVII -Watson Seed	2016					19.8%	19.9%	19.8%
FAE XVIII - Maadows	2016					19,0%	20.2%	19.6%
Garysburg Solar	2016					20.8%	20.1%	20.4%
Gaston Solar	2016					21.2%	19.8%	20.5%
Gates Solar	2016					20.9%	22.8%	21.9%
Green Farm Solar	2016					22.3%	16.6%	19.4%
Hardison Farm Solar	2016					23.3%	21.2%	22.2%
Hemlock Solar	2016					18.6%	22.7%	20.6%
Leggett Solar	2016					18.7%	22.7%	20.7%
Long Farm 46 Solar	2016					18.3%	17.8%	18.1%
MCI Solar	2016					22.0%	20.0%	21.0%
Modiin Farm Solar	2016					23.1%	21.3%	22.2%
River Road Solar	2016					18.6%	18.0%	18.3%
Schell Solar Farm	2016	•				20.7%	19.9%	20.3%
Seaboard Solar	2016					20.7%	19.6%	20.1%
Simons Farm Solar SolNC10 Solar	2016					12,2%	21.7%	21.9%
SolNC10 Solar Sugar Run Solar (SolNC3)	2016					18.4%	19.6%	19.0%
TWE Kelford Solar	2016 2016					23.2%	22.2%	22.7%
Whitakers Farm Solar	2016					16.9% 21,8%	18.1% 20.3%	17.5%
White Farm Solar	2016					23.3%	20.3%	21.9%
Williamston Speight Splar	2016					22.3%	19.6%	20.9%
Williamston West Farm Solar	2016					19.9%	19.8%	19.8%
Winton Solar	2016					19.9%	21.1%	19.6%
Woodiand Solar	2016					21.5%	20.1%	20.8%
Essex Solar Centor	2017					/	21.6%	21.6%
Cork Oak Solar	2017						19.2%	19.2%
Davis Lone Solar	2017						20.0%	20.0%
FAE XXI-Benthali Sridge PVi	2017						19.9%	19.9%
FAE XXII -Baker PVI	2017						20.5%	20.6%
FAE XXXV -Turkey Creek	2017						18,9%	18.9%
FIAE II - Flat Mooks	2017						9.8%	9.8%
Floyd Road Solar	2017						20,5%	20.5%
HXNAir Solar One	2017						1.0%	1.0%
Sunflower Solar	2017						19.6%	10.6%
Chowan Jehu Road Solar	2018							N/A
Cettonwood Solar	2018							N/A
FAE XIX - American Legion PVI	2018							N/A
FAE XXV - Vaughn's Creek	2018	ł						N/A
Phelps 158 Solar Farm	2018							N/A
Shiloh Hwy 1109 Solar	2018							N/A
TWE Ahoskie Solar Project	2018							N/A
Sendy Solar	2018							N/A
Northern Cardinal	2018							N/A
Carl Friedrich Gauss Solar	2018							N/A
Sun Faim VI	2018							N/A
Sun Farm V	2018							N/A

<sup>1</sup> Capacity factors only provided for full years of operation. COD year excluded as the partial year is not representative of the requested annual capacity factor. <sup>2</sup> 2017 was the first year that all Solar Partnership facilities were COD for a full year.

### ATTACHMENT GLA-3 CONFIDENTIAL

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### PART C

Myers

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#### Summary of Carol B. Myers' Testimony

My August 24, 2018, pre-filed testimony in this proceeding discussed, among other things, the accounting treatment of twelve generating units identified in the 2018 Integrated Resource Plan ("2018 IRP") of Virginia Electric and Power Company d/b/a Dominion Energy Virginia ("Company") to be retired early in 2021 or 2022. Ten of these units were placed in cold reserve status during calendar year 2018. On March 25, 2019, the Company announced that it will immediately retire the ten generating units in cold reserve status. Additionally, the Company announced plans to retire Unit 5 at Possum Point Power Station in 2021. My testimony identifies the remaining net book value of these units in the amount of \$333.20 million as of December 31, 2018, and discusses the potential regulatory accounting treatment of any associated impairment or abandonment write-off of these costs pursuant to § 56-585.1 A 8 of the Code of Virginia.

## **PRE-FILED TESTIMONY**

### OF

### CAROL B. MYERS

# VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY CASE NO. PUR-2018-00065

## April 18, 2019

# Q1. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND THE POSITION YOU HOLD WITH THE STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION ("COMMISSION").

 A1. My name is Carol B. Myers. I am a Deputy Director in the Commission's Division of Utility Accounting and Finance.

# Q2. DID YOU PREVIOUSLY FILE TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING ON AUGUST 24, 2018?

A2. Yes, I did. That testimony discussed, among other things, the accounting treatment of twelve generating units identified in the 2018 Integrated Resource Plan ("2018 IRP") of Virginia Electric and Power Company d/b/a Dominion Energy Virginia ("Dominion" or "Company") to be retired early in 2021 or 2022.<sup>1</sup> Those units are identified in the following table:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Exhibit 3 (Myers) at 3 through 8.

Table 1
2018 IRP Generating Unit Retirement Date Assumptions

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		2018 IRP	
	MW	<u>Retirement</u>	
<b>Generating Unit</b>	Output	Date	<u>Fuel Type</u>
Bellemeade Power Station	267 MW	2021	Natural Gas
Bremo Power Station - Unit 3	71 MW	2021	Natural Gas
Bremo Power Station - Unit 4	156 MW	2021	Natural Gas
Chesterfield Power Station - Unit 3	98 MW	2021	Coal
Chesterfield Power Station - Unit 4	163 MW	2021	Coal
Mecklenburg Power Station - Unit 1	69 MW	2021	Coal
Mecklenburg Power Station - Unit 2	69 MW	2021	Coal
Pittsylvania Power Station	83 MW	2021	Wood
Possum Point Power Station - Unit 3	96 MW	2021	Natural Gas
Possum Point Power Station - Unit 4	220 MW	2021	Natural Gas
Possum Point Power Station - Unit 5	786 MW	2021	Oil
Yorktown Power Station - Unit 3	790 MW	2022	Oil

Except for Unit 5 at Possum Point Power Station and Unit 3 at Yorktown Power Station, the Company placed the other ten units into cold reserve status during calendar year 2018.

# Q3. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

A3. On March 25, 2019, the Company announced that it will immediately retire the ten units in cold reserve status. Additionally, the Company announced plans to retire Unit 5 at Possum Point Power Station in 2021. The purpose of my testimony is to identify the remaining net book value of these units and to discuss the potential regulatory accounting treatment of any associated impairment or abandonment write-off of these costs.

# Q4. PLEASE IDENTIFY THE REMAINING NET BOOK VALUE OF THESE UNITS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2018.

A4. The remaining net book value of these units as of December 31, 2018, was \$333.20 million. Historically, the capital cost of the units has been recovered from customers through the depreciation expense included in base rate cost of service. The remaining net book value of \$333.20 million is the undepreciated capital cost of the units that remained to be recovered from customers as of December 31, 2018. The following table presents this remaining net book value, by unit:<sup>2</sup>

# Table 2 Net Book Values as of December 31, 2018 (In Millions of Dollars)

<b>Generating Unit</b>	<u>MW Output</u>	<u>Retirement Date</u>	<u>Net B</u>	ook Value
Bellemeade Power Station	267 MW	Immediate	\$	61.33
Bremo Power Station - Unit 3	207 MW	Immediate	տ Տ	22.72
Bremo Power Station - Unit 4	156 MW	Immediate	\$	37.01
Chesterfield Power Station - Unit 3	98 MW	Immediate	\$	13.08
Chesterfield Power Station - Unit 4	163 MW	Immediate	\$	37.25
Mecklenburg Power Station - Unit 1	69 MW	Immediate	\$	16.89
Mecklenburg Power Station - Unit 2	69 MW	Immediate	\$	16.39
Pittsylvania Power Station	83 MW	Immediate	\$	40.03
Possum Point Power Station - Unit 3	96 MW	Immediate	\$	2.93
Possum Point Power Station - Unit 4	220 MW	Immediate	\$	11.22
Possum Point Power Station - Unit 5	<u>786 MW</u>	2021	\$	74.35
Total	2078 MW		\$	333.20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For power stations where all units are retired, the unit net book values identified above include an allocation of common plant. *See* my supporting workpaper and the Company's response to Environmental Respondents' Interrogatory Set 12, Question No. 4 included in Appendix A to my testimony for additional details.

# Q5. PLEASE DISCUSS THE POTENTIAL REGULATORY ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF ANY IMPAIRMENT OR ABANDONMENT WRITE-OFF OF THESE COSTS.

A5. It is Staff's understanding that the Company will likely write-off a significant portion of the remaining net book value of these units on its books in calendar year 2019, in order to recognize the abandonment or impairment of the units for financial reporting purposes in the accounting period in which the decision to retire the units occurred.<sup>3</sup> If the Company takes such a write-off on its books, § 56-585.1 A 8 of the Code of Virginia, as amended by the 2018 Grid Transformation and Security Act,<sup>4</sup> requires that, for purposes of reviewing Dominion's earnings in triennial reviews, the cost of asset impairments related to early retirement determinations made by the Company for generation facilities fueled by coal, natural gas, or oil are deemed fully recovered in the test period in which they were recorded per books by the Company for financial reporting purposes. All other things remaining equal, the Virginia jurisdictional portion of such a write-off will serve to reduce the Company's earnings in the first triennial review and will thus reduce potential refunds due to customers or dollars available for customer credit reinvestment offset in that proceeding.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Company witness Kelly addressed abandonment or impairment entries in his rebuttal testimony. *See* Exhibit 44 (Kelly Rebuttal) at 11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> 2018 Va. Acts of Assembly ch. 296.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> For illustrative purposes, a one-time write-off of \$333.20 million would reduce the Company's Virginia jurisdictional annual earned return on equity by approximately 4 percentage points.

# Q6. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?

A6. Yes, it does.

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# MYERS APPENDIX A

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Not Book Voluo with	Common Plant Allocated	13,083,406	009'LCZ'/S		16,894,469	16,388,580		44,902,251	16,426,291		22,719,511	37,007,568	2,926,186	11,218,147		38,061,598	1,187,094	785,281	74,345,757	333,197,799
Allocation of	Ħ	1	•	,	4,322,058	4,192,638	I	5,004,904	1,830,911	ı	7,387,210	12,032,947	ı	ı	ı	15,993,733	498,825	329,980		51,593,206
Vorkpaper	Net Book Value (NBV)	13,083,406	000,102,15	8,514,696	12,572,411	12,195,942	6,835,815	39,897,347	14,595,380	19,420,157	15,332,301	24,974,621	2,926,186	11,218,147	16,822,538	22,067,865	688,269	455,301	74,345,757	333,197,799
Supporting Workpaper	Accumulated Depreciation	53,822,688	54,294,430	2,549,671	5,137,534	5,141,100	1,996,199	14,344,024	3,454,458	21,677,466	22,826,160	33,150,655	43,424,579	55,024,621	2,781,805	11,439,248	97,472	75,333	171,284,862	502,522,305
	Acquisition Value	66,906,094	91,546,090	11,064,367	17,709,945	17,337,043	8,832,014	54,241,371	18,049,838	41,097,622	38,158,461	58,125,276	46,350,765	66,242,769	19,604,343	33,507,113	785,741	530,634	245,630,619	835,720,104
	<u>Plant/Unit</u>	Chesterfield Unit 3	Chesterneid Unit 4	Mecklenburg Commor	Mecklenburg Unit 1	Mecklenburg Unit 2	Bellemeade Common	Bellemeade Unit 1	Bellemeade Unit 2	Bremo Common	Bremo Unit 3	Bremo Unit 4	Possum Point Unit 3	Possum Point Unit 4	Pittsylvania Common	Pittsylvania Unit 1	Pittsylvania Unit 2	Pittsylvania Unit 3	Possum Point Unit 5	Total

Net Book Values of Early Retirement Units As of December 31, 2018

\*Source: Environmental Respondents' Set 12, Question No. 4

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## Virginia Electric and Power Company Case No. PUR-2018-00065 Environmental Respondents Twelfth Set

The following supplemental response to Question No. 4 (dated April 8, 2019) of the Twelfth Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents Propounded by the Environmental Respondents received on March 12, 2019 has been prepared under my supervision.

Matthew J. Williams Supervisor, Fixed Asset Accounting Dominion Energy Scrvices

#### Question No. 4

Please provide the book value, amortization, and depreciation schedules for the following:

- a) each of the Company's coal-fired generating units;
- b) each of the Company's natural gas-fired generating units;
- c) each of the Company's nuclear generating units;
- d) cach of the Company's biomass generating units;
- e) each of the Company's heavy fuel oil units;
- f) each of the Company's light fuel oil units;
- g) each of the Company's conventional hydro units;
- h) cach of the Company's pumped hydro units.

#### Response:

See Attachment ER Set 12-4 (1) (MJW) for the acquisition values, accumulated depreciation, and net book values as of December 31, 2018 for the requested Dominion Energy Virginia generating units. Depreciation rates for these units are determined as part of a Depreciation Study for Dominion Energy Virginia, which was last performed as of December 31, 2016. To the extent the request for "depreciation schedules" refers to the rates determined as a result of this study, see Confidential Attachment ER Set 12-4 (2) (MJW) for the relevant excerpted pages (VI-4 – VI-13) from the 2016 Depreciation Study showing the depreciation rates for the related generating units. Confidential Attachment ER Set 12-4 (2) (MJW) contains confidential information in its entirety and is being provided pursuant to pursuant to the protections set forth in 5 VAC 5-20-170 and subject to the Hearing Examiner's Protective Ruling and Additional Protective Treatment for Extraordinarily Sensitive Information entered on May 18, 2018, as modified by Hearing Examiner's Rulings dated June 7, 2018 and June 14, 2018, and any subsequent protective order or ruling that may be issued for confidential or extraordinarily sensitive information in this proceeding, and pursuant to Agreements to Adhere executed pursuant to any such orders or rulings.

DOM-2018-IRP-000965

Attachment ER Set 12-4(1)(MJW) Net book value of Virginia Power Generating Units As of December 31, 2018

Coal

	Plant/Unit	A 1 111	A Line Discussion	
	manvonii	Acquisition Value	Accumulated Depreciation	Net Book Value
	Chesterfield Common	780,556,229.70	185,347,350.36	595,208,879.34
	Chesterfield Unit 3	66,906,094.44	53,822,688.41	13,083,406.03
	Chesterfield Unit 4	91,546,089.63	54,294,429.64	37,251,659.99
	Chesterfield Unit 5	265,789,049.13	160,724,906.98	105,064,142.15
	Chesterfield Unit 6	721,361,877.26	333,187,661.86	388,174,215.40
	Clover Common	119,975,521.09	44,859,784.27	75,115,736.82
	Clover Unit 1	246,826,586.42	103,328,053.35	143,498,533.07
	Clover Unit 2	233,953,154.55	94,871,051.18	139,082,103.37
	Mecklenburg Common	11,064,366.95	2,549,670.81	8,514,696.14
	Mecklenburg Unit 1	17,709,945.17	5,137,534.28	12,572,410.89
	Mecklenburg Unit 2	17,337,042.58	5,141,100.37	12,195,942.21
	Mount Storm Common	339,333,588.35	154,938,572.95	184,395,015.40
	Mount Storm Unit 1	502,664,261.02	289,888,889.37	212,775,371.65
	Mount Storm Unit 2	434,317,169.75	251,757,624.04	182,559,545.71
	Mount Storm Unit 3	564,430,300.60	323,744,945.88	240,685,354.72
		564,450,500.60	223,744,943.00	240,080,354.72
	Virginia City	1,973,100,658.30	298,818,353.53	1,674,282,304.77
Natural C	Gas			
	Plant/Unit	Acquisition Value	Accumulated Depreciation	Net Book Value
	Bear Garden	635,637,532.48	72,557,913.56	563,079,618.92
	Bellemeade Common	8,832,013.69	1,996,198.79	6,835,814.90
	Bellemeade Unit 1	54,241,370.55	14,344,023.99	39,897,346.56
	Bellemeade Unit 2	18,049,838.12	3,454,457.75	14,595,380.37
	Bremo Common	41,097,622.38	. 21,677,465.56	19,420,156.82
	Bremo Unit 3	38,158,460.84	22,826,159.85	15,332,300.99
	Bremo Unit 4	58,125,275.76	33,150,655.06	24,974,620.70
	Brunswick	1,105,321,568.57	71,664,183.66	1,033,657,384.91
	Chesterfield Unit 7	152,138,230.27	84,110,003.51	68,028,226.76
	Chesterfield Unit 8	151,675,780.59	94,429,887.79	57,245,892.80
	Gordonsville Common	15,698,447.38	4,514,519.43	11,183,927.95
	Gordonsville Unit 1	22,390,712.83	7,236,113.48	15,154,599.35
	Gordonsville Unit 2	21,674,214.00	7,896,012.52	13,778,201.48
		21,074,214.00	1,030,012.02	13,170,201.40
	Greensville	1,270,128,766.16	3,961,826.91	1,266,166,939.25
	Possum Point Common	60,875,139.37	17,250,145.27	43,624,994.10
	Possum Point Unit 3	46,350,765.44	43,424,579.39	2,926,186.05
	Possum Point Unit 4	66,242,768.59	55,024,621.22	11,218,147.37
	Possum Point Unit 6	438,688,346.72	103,973,498.37	334,714,848.35

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Rosemary Common	15,579,320.35	5,449,222.94	10,130,097.41
Rosemary Unit 1	10,532,012.25	4,360,181.22	6,171,831.03
Rosemary Unit 2	7,444,015.24	3,106,616.49	4,337,398.75
Warren County	1,060,106,383.22	117,472,500.78	942,633,882.44
Combustion Turbine			
Plant/Unit	Acquisition Value	Accumulated Depreciation	Net Book Value
Chesapeake CT Common	2,995,985.70	1,645,443.58	1,350,542.12
Chesapeake CT Unit 1	2,592,103.44	2,214,851.54	377,251.90
Chesapeake CT Unit 2	2,444,033.00	2,426,893.74	17,139.26
Chesapeake CT Unit 4	2,124,916.52	2,095,403.53	29,512.99
Chesapeake CT Unit 6	2,086,278.68	2,056,783.08	29,495.60
Darbytown Common	15,121,278.71	10,426,932.10	4,694,346.61
Darbytown Unit 1	19,618,896.83	17,106,548.16	2,512,348.67
Darbytown Unit 2	19,332,215.40	16,026,278.20	3,305,937.20
Darbytown Unit 3	19,233,050.17	16,441,201.91	2,791,848.26
Darbytown Unit 4	18,817,283.88	16,643,677.74	2,173,606.14
Elizabeth River CT Common	7,647,671.81	2,310,515.02	5,337,156.79
Elizabeth River CT Unit 1	17,421,879.95	6,835,081.58	10,586,798.37
Elizabeth River CT Unit 2	16,955,026.64	6,787,511.92	10,167,514.72
Elizabeth River CT Unit 3	16,684,088.93	7,563,471.07	9,120,617.86
Gravel Neck CT Common	11,729,846.38	5,452,991.50	6,276,854.88
Gravel Neck CT Unit 1	3,387,351.93	2,683,119.95	704,231.98
Gravel Neck CT Unit 2	4,432,258.35	2,674,249.66	1,758,008.69
Gravel Neck CT Unit 3	21,794,916.75	17,803,002.40	3,991,914.35
Gravel Neck CT Unit 4	20,756,346.99	17,420,343.54	3,336,003.45
Gravel Neck CT Unit 5	20,799,544.20	17,576,202.27	3,223,341.93
Gravel Neck CT Unit 6	22,061,235.40	18,257,440.27	3,803,795.13
Ladysmith CT Common	71,474,271.16	17,916,239.02	53,558,032.14
Ladysmith CT Unit 1	46,358,976.71	12,532,314.24	33,826,662.47
Ladysmith CT Unit 2	47,087,117.74	12,631,214.32	34,455,903.42
Ladysmith CT Unit 3	57,438,452.99	9,109,088.31	48,329,364.68
Ladysmith CT Unit 4	42,876,740.54	9,392,751.68	33,483,988.86
Ladysmith CT Unit 5	66,507,379.78	13,562,245.41	52,945,134.37
Low Moor CT Common	7,210,508.48	7,056,004.03	154,504.45
Low Moor CT Unit 1	1,096,538.48	957,381.27	139,157.21
Low Moor CT Unit 2	670,215.86	653,522.55	16,693.31
Low Moor CT Unit 3	694,196.56	694,196.56	-
Low Moor CT Unit 4	632,548.41	486,397.48	146,150.93
Northern Neck CT Common	8,421,402.86	8,094,360.23	327,042.63
Northern Neck CT Unit 1	775,262.80	582,223.30	193,039.50
Northern Neck CT Unit 2	606,799.94	422,222.41	184,577.53
Northern Neck CT Unit 3	531,086.40	469,148.99	61,937.41
Northern Neck CT Unit 4	614,539.54	414,819.29	199,720.25
Possum Point CT Common	2,010,039.96	1,985,646.61	24,393.35
Possum Point CT Unit 1	1,537,505.09	1,530,449.25	7,055.84
Possum Point CT Unit 2	1,492,462.68	1,472,371.04	20,091.64

	Possum Point CT Unit 3	1,487,069.21	1,480,013.37	7,055.84
	Possum Point CT Unit 4	1,829,559.01	1,822,503.17	7,055.84
	Possum Point CT Unit 5	1,491,686.17	1,484,630.33	7,055.84
	Possum Point CT Unit 6	1,531,848.16	1,524,792.32	7,055.84
	Remington CT Common	27,475,350.41	12,499,569.95	14,975,780.46
	Remington CT Unit 1	45,241,807.84	12,970,175.00	32,271,632.84
	Remington CT Unit 2	45,803,222.17	12,784,803.09	33,018,419.08
	Remington CT Unit 3	47,000,245.81	11,245,403.96	35,754,841.85
	Remington CT Unit 4	45,358,607.32	13,003,266.53	32,355,340.79
Nuclear				
	Plant/Unit	Acquisition Value	Accumulated Depreciation	Net Book Value
	North Anna Common	741,024,463.48	341,858,360.61	399,166,102.87
	North Anna Unit 1	981,317,282.15	577,125,013.71	404,192,268.44
	North Anna Unit 2	814,836,848.82	381,491,863.53	433,344,985.29
	Surry Common	700,276,088.33	485,295,842.57	214,980,245.76
	Surry Unit 1	1,020,825,803.33	519,704,176.79	501,121,626.54
	Surry Unit 2	745,615,631.41	378,306,909.96	367,308,721.45
Biomass				
	Plant/Unit	Acquisition Value	Accumulated Depreciation	Net Book Value
	Altavista Common	76,961,783.96	15,982,360.04	60,979,423.92
	Altavista Unit 1	2,117,507.72	1,958,228.34	159,279.38
	Altavista Unit 2	65,898.25	8,168.33	57,729.92
		00,000.20	0,100.00	01,120,02
	Hopewell Common	72,920,829.74	15,522,478.00	57,398,351.74
	Hopewell Unit 1	1,014,044.98	406,659.23	607,385.75
	Hopewell Unit 2	86,269.50	21,128.25	65,141.25
	Pittsylvania Common	19,604,342.69	2,781,804.92	16,822,537.77
	Pittsylvania Unit 1	33,507,112.72	11,439,247.81	22,067,864.91
	Pittsylvania Unit 2	785,741.37	97,472.00	688,269.37
	Pittsylvania Unit 3	530,633.76	75,333.02	455,300.74
	Southampton Common	69,227,591.79	15,447,991.71	53,779,600.08
	Southampton Unit 1	1,537,810.52	1,091,349.06	446,461.46
	Southampton Unit 2	250,662.35	147,453.47	103,208.88
Oil				
	Plant/Unit	Acquisition Value	Accumulated Depreciation	Net Book Value
	Possum Point Unit 5	245,630,619.39	171,284,862.01	74,345,757.38
	Yorktown 3	234,539,073.72	172,835,235.60	61,703,838.12
	Yorktown Common	91,519,224.12	55,194,926.94	36,324,297.18
Conventio	onal Hydro			
	Plant/Unit	Acquisition Value	Accumulated Depreciation	Net Book Value
	Gaston Common	12,958,729.66	5,102,851.32	7,855,878.34
	Gaston Unit 1	34,149,420.81	28,624,291.01	5,525,129.80
	Gaston Unit 2	5,461,628.00	1,701,492.45	3,760,135.55
	Gaston Unit 3	3,708,992.82	1,384,612.79	2,324,380.03
	Gaston Unit 4	2,656,657.94	605,686.71	2,050,971.23

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	Roanoke Rapids Common	17,126,882.56	5,677,045.40	11,449,837.16	0
	Roanoke Rapids Unit 1	34,407,913.39	26,095,406.45	8,312,506.94	Ę.
	Roanoke Rapids Unit 2	2,500,329.20	1,719,574.38	780,754.82	C4
	Roanoke Rapids Unit 3	2,000,280.99	1,257,725.84	742,555.15	ø
	Roanoke Rapids Unit 4	2,199,736.31	1,432,845.43	766,890.88	00
	North Anna Hydro Common	462,399.00	367,905.19	94,493.81	÷.[]
	North Anna Hydro Unit 1	1,325,026.00	931,295.25	393,730.75	
	North Anna Hydro Unit 2	361,506.00	291,858.01	69,647.99	
Pumpec	i Hydro				
	Plant/Unit	Acquisition Value	Accumulated Depreciation	Net Book Value	
	Bath Common	769,211,109.58	494,540,580.60	274,670,528.98	

Bath Common	769,211,109.58	494,540,580.60	274,670,528.98
Bath Unit 1	47,424,778.04	24,180,607.47	23,244,170.57
Bath Unit 2	46,608,803.00	23,688,797.56	22,920,005.44
Bath Unit 3	45,029,181.85	22,897,826.83	22,131,355.02
Bath Unit 4	54,000,465.31	23,560,363.66	30,440,101.65
Bath Unit 5	42,799,150.09	23,753,784.11	19,045,365.98
Bath Unit 6	50,977,323.26	26,269,103.18	24,708,220.08

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